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SUPREME COURT ANTITRUST 1991-92:
THE REVENGE OF THE AMICI
STEPHEN CALKINS*
Interested parties regularly flood the Supreme Court with briefs, but
whether they accomplish much besides employing lawyers is open to
question. This year the amici made a difference. In each of the three
cases considered in this review of antitrust in the Supreme Court's 199 1-
92 term-FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.,' Morales v. TWA,2 and Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. 3-amici appear to have influ-
enced the Court's reasoning and, perhaps, result.
In part because of the role of amici, this was one of the most interesting
terms in memory. Ticor introduced an entirely new approach to applying
part of the state action exemption, and raised questions about the viability
of the exemption. Morales found federal preemption of state initiatives
concerning the airline regulation, and featured a Chicago School ap-
proach to economic reasoning, withJustice Scalia writing for the majority,
Justice Stevens for the dissent. These two Justices reversed positions in
Kodak, potentially one of the most important antitrust cases in years.
The Court addressed summary judgment, tying, market definition, and
monopolization; perhaps even more significant, it showed a skepticism
about Chicago School-type a priori reasoning and a lack of confidence
in the market that could influence cases in every part of antitrust.
For each of these developments, amici played central roles. In Ticor
the amici States joined the Federal Trade Commission in criticizing state
regulation; this alliance made a difficult case seem easy. In Morales and
the developments preceding it the federal government repeatedly ob-
jected to Texas's approach to airline regulation, which again made the
* Interim Dean and Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. Tile author
thanks William Blumenthal, John F. Dolan, James D. Hurwitz, Robert T. Joseph, and
Daniel M. Wall for comments on a draft, Ted Tow and Julie L. Schwartz for research
assistance, countless colleagues for discussing these issues, and John DeQ. Briggs for
providing copies of briefs.
112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992).
2 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
3 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
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outcome appear relatively obvious. In Kodak amici brought the Court
both legal reasoning and information about marketplace realities.
In all three cases amici served as a reality check. In Ticoramici explained
how regulation worked (or didn't). In Morales the amicus United States
exploded any misimpression that the States were acting in harmony
with the federal government. In Kodak amici explained how real-world
competition differed from economic theory. In each case there were
costs, however. These costs are especially apparent in Ticor, where amici
made the case seem deceptively simple, and in Kodak, where amici contrib-
uted to a continuing evolution of arguments that required the Court to
address issues that were never solidly joined.
I. FTC V. TICOR TITLE INSURANCE CO.
Every so often a case has a majority opinion, a dissent, and even a
concurrence, each of which seems correct. Ticor Title Insurance was such
a case.
A. BACKGROUND
Ticor addressed a Federal Trade Commission decision condemning
five large title insurance companies' use of rating bureaus in Arizona,
Connecticut, Montana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.4 At
issue was the Midcal "active supervision" requirement and its application
to various forms of "negative option" rate regulation. Under California
Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum Inc.,5 a private party is
exempt under the state-action doctrine if two tests are met: "First, the
challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised'
by the State itself."'
I Complaint at 11, Ticor Title Insurance Co., 112 F.T.C. 344, 346 (complaint filed
Jan. 7, 1985) ("Respondents have agreed on the price to be charged for title search and
examination services or settlement services through rating bureaus in various states.").
' 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (Powell, J.).
" 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389, 410 (1978) (opinion of Justice Brennan)). The second test ("active supervision") was
held inapplicable to regulated municipalities in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471
U.S. 34 (1985) (Powell, J.). This article necessarily assumes basic familiarity with the state
action and Noerr-Pennington doctrines. For a more general overview see ABA AN-i-rRUST
SECTION, ANITrrRUsr LAW DEVELOPMENTS 965-1016 (3d ed. 1992).
The text gives a truncated version of the Ticor saga. Alter trial, Administrative Law Judge
Morton Needelman found a violation with respect to Connecticut and Wisconsin. Judge
Needelman rejected defenses based on the McCarran-Ferguson Act's insurance exemption,
15 U.S.C. § 1013, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine's protection of petitioning activity, and the
state action exenmption. The Federal Trade Commission, on review, found a violation in
those states and also in Arizona, Montana, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The Commission
dismissed charges for Idaho and Ohio. The Commission was evenly split on Idaho. 112
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The Third Circuit reversed the FTC's decision finding violations
That court complained that the FTC was principally criticizing the quality
of state supervision, which, the court said, was not the issue. The court
relied heavily on a First Circuit formulation developed in New England
Motor Rate Bureau, Inc. v. FTC:
Where as here the state's program is in place, is staffed and funded,
grants to the state officials ample power and the duty to regulate pursu-
ant to declared standards of state policy, is enforceable in the state's
courts, and demonstrates some basic level of activity directed towards
seeing that the private actors carry out the state's policy and not simply
their own policy, more need not be established. Otherwise, the state
action doctrine would be turned on its head. Instead of being a doctrine
of preemption, allowing room for the state's own action, it would become
a means for federal oversight of state officials and their programs.'
Applying this test the Third Circuit found adequate supervision in Ari-
zona, Connecticut, Montana, and Wisconsin, the states where FTC law-
yers had conceded there was clear articulation of an intention to displace
competition; and it found clear articulation of such an intention in New
Jersey and Pennsylvania, where FTC lawyers had conceded there was
active supervision.)
After the Third Circuit defeat, FTC lawyers quickly retreated and
regrouped around the claims concerning regulation by Montana and
Wisconsin, the two states as to which the Commission had voted unani-
F.T.C. at 441-42 (views of Commissioners Calvani and Strenio). It found a lack of proof
that rating bureaus had been used to fix prices in Ohio. Id. at 444-45.
Even this finding of a violation in six states was not simple. Commissioner Azcuenaga, in
a separate statement, criticized the majority and dissented with respect to Arizona and
Connecticut, finding sufficiently active supervision. Ticor, 112 F.T.C. at 468, 478 (Az-
cuenaga, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part). Commissioner Strenio, who
wrote the Commission's opinion, also issued a separate statement responding to Commis-
sioner Azcuenaga. Id. at 478. Commissioner Calvani, in a separate statement, dissented
with respect to New Jersey and Pennsylvania, agreeing with the Law Judge that there was
sufficiently clear articulation of a purpose to replace competition in those states. Id. at 467
(Calvani, Comm'r, dissenting in part). Chairman Daniel Oliver, whose term expired August
10, 1989, was reported to have "registered his vote in the affirmative for the Final Order and
Opinion of the Commission," even though the order and opinion were dated September 19,
1989. Id. at 487 n.*. Neither Commissioner Machol, who took office November 29, 1988,
nor Chairman Janet Steiger, who took office August I1, 1989, participated in the proceed-
ing. Oral argument took place at the FTC on Nov. 6, 1987.
7 922 F.2d 1122 (3d Cir. 1991) (Hutchinson, J.).
s 908 F.2d 1064, 1071 (lst Cir. 1990) (Campbell, j.), quoted in Ticor, 922 F.2d at 1136.
The Third Circuit may have been unimpressed by the disarray at the Commission. Of the
four Commissioners who voted for all or part of the order, the only one not to issue a
separate statement was Chairman Olivet, who departed the Commission more than a
month before the opinion was issued but left behind him an affirmative vote. See supra note
6. The Third Circuit reviewed the unhappy story in detail. Ticor, 922 F.2d at 1126 nn.6-
8 and accompanying text.
" 922 F.2d at 1129-35. The Supreme Court (lid not reach the clear articulation issue.
1993]
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mously.'0 The gambit succeeded. The Supreme Court followed this lead"'
and found that respondents were not immune in Montana and Wiscon-
sin, It remanded to permit the Third Circuit to reconsider its views on
Arizona and Connecticut.
2
Ticor posed a dilemma. If one takes "active supervision" seriously one
is almost compelled to monitor the performance of state regulators. But
if one does monitor such performance, one has to engage in meddling
that would appear to threaten federalism interests."
Few observers were confident of the likely outcome. On the one hand,
defendants had lost each of the previous three Supreme Court "active
supervision" cases. 4 On the other hand, the Court in Southern Motor
Carriers15 had blessed negative-option regulation in the context of a deci-
sion addressing Midcal's first (clear articulation) prong. 6 Since then,
0 The Commission unsuccessfully requested a rehearing, based on Montana and Wiscon-
sin. Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, Ticor, 922 F.2d at 1141
(petition denied Mar. 12, 1991) (8-3).
The United States's Petition for Certiorari focused almost exclusively on these two states,
complaining only briefly that the Third Circuit had not been sufficiently deferential to the
Commission's fact-finding about Arizona and Connecticut. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
at 5 n. 1, 19-20, Ticor (noting that the Court could remand the case for application of "the
correct standard" to Arizona and Connecticut).
" The Court wrote that the "parties have confined their briefing" on the state action
issue to Montana and Wisconsin, focusing on Arizona and Connecticut "in briefing the
second question" (whether the Third Circuit properly deferred to FTC fact-finding). This
is a better characterization of the briefs of the United States and its amicus supporters than
of the respondents.
' 112 S. Ct. at 2180.
Particularly intriguing was a ground for decision which the Commission did not ad-
vance and on which the Supreme Court did not rely. In neither the Administrative Law
judge's opinion nor the Commission's opinion was it asserted or even suggested that the
state action defense is unavailable in FTC cases. The Commission mentioned the issue only
in a perfunctory note stating that the doctrine applies in Section 5 cases. 112 F.T.C. at 424
n.5 (citing, "e.g.," Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir.
1959)). The Supreme Court nonetheless devoted a paragraph to the question. It observed
that its previous state-action cases arose under the Sherman Act, noted that the FTC had
at times argued that the doctrine does not apply in Commission proceedings (citing a 1975
staff report), noted that at least one treatise had disagreed, and then declared that it "need
not determine" whether the doctrine should be applied differently in FTC proceedings,
because the Commission in Ticor had not asserted "superior preemption authority." 112 S.
Ct. at 2177-78. If nothing else, this discussion is an invitation for the Commission to
consider asserting such authority.
" Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) (no state program actively supervising peer-
review decisions); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1987) (insufficient
control over liquor pricing); Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06 (no review of privately-set price
schedules for wine).
"5 Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985)
(Powell, J.).
1 Until Southern Motor Carriers, collective rate-making was thought to be immunized as
state action only when compelled by the state, thus making clear the state's responsibility.
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moreover, the Supreme Court and especially its morejuniorJustices had
shown increased solicitude for federalism, most notably in Omni.I"
B. THE COURT'S OPINION
The Court's opinion, by Justice Kennedy, featured a new concept in
state action active-supervision cases: a causation analysis. The Court
wrote that the purpose of the active supervision inquiry
is to determine whether the State has exercised sufficient independent
judgment and control so that the details of the rates or prices have been
established as a product of deliberate state intervention, not simply by
agreement among private parties. Much as in causation inquiries the
analysis asks whether the State has played a substantial role in determin-
ing these specifics of the economic policy. The question is not how well
state regulation works but whether the anticompetitive scheme is the
State's own."
In the context of negative-option regulation, "the party claiming the
immunity must show that state officials have undertaken the necessary
steps to determine the specifics of the price-fixing or rate setting
scheme." 9 Relying to an unusual extent on findings by the law judge,
rather than the Commission, 0 the Court found that neither Montana
nor Wisconsin had done this.2'
This view changed when the Court found it sufficient that a state expressly permitted
such conduct. In Southern Motor Carriers the Government had conceded that the "active
supervision" test had been met, so the Court did not address that issue. Yet the Court
appeared to recognize the value of negative-option regulation, so the Ticor respondents
relied heavily on that case and emphasized the risk that finding against them would severely
curtail the use of such regulation. E.g., Respondents' Brief at 26 (one of seven pages on
which case is cited) ("State programs such as those here are possible only if private parties
participate. [citing Southern Motor Carriers] If participation involves a substantial risk of
antitrust liability-that is, if the quality or effectiveness of the States' regulatory determina-
tions may be subject to later federal antitrust review-the programs will fail for lack of
participation.").
" City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Il1 S. Ct. 1344, 1349 (1990) (state
action doctrine based "on principles of federalism and state sovereignty"). Omni and its
focus on federalism is discussed in Stephen Calkins, The 1990-91 Supreme Court Term and
Antitrust: Toward Greater Certainty, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 603 (1991).
" 112 S. Ct. at 2177.
'9 Id. at 2179.
20 The Commission can and often does make extensive factual findings, although it is not
unusual for it to say it is adopting findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that are
not inconsistent with its opinion. Cf. Ticor, 112 F.T.C. at 486 (ordering that the Law Judge's
decision "be adopted as findings of fact and conclusions of law except to the extent
inconsistent with the accompanying opinion"). At least in theory, then, the only findings
that matter are the Commission's. But cf. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493
U.S. 411, 415-19, 422 (1990) (extensive citing of initial decision, also by ALJ Needelman);
Ticor, 922 F.2d at 1127 n.10 (Third Circuit's discussion of title insurance "is based on the
excellent survey of this area that the ALJ compiled in his opinion").
21 "[F]atal to respondents' attempts to portray the state regulatory regimes as providing
the necessary component of active supervision," the Court wrote, were findings that rate
1993]
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If you take Midcal's "active supervision" requirements seriously, the
Court is right. Particularly significant was that thirty-three states, includ-
ing the critical states of Montana and Wisconsin, made clear in an amicus
brief that they did not consider an exemption justified. In Wisconsin and
Montana "there was no review, whatsoever, of the merits of the prices
for search and examination services set by respondents," according to
the States' amicus brief.22 If words have their ordinary meaning, it is
difficult to conclude that a state actively supervised when the state itself
insists there was no review.
The most interesting aspect of the case was the debate about federal-
ism, which provided important background to the decision. Ticor
-2
1
sought to portray itself as federalism's champion. "The Decision of the
Federal Trade Commission Improperly Intruded into State Regulatory
Decisions and Procedures," a heading in its brief boldly declared.2"4 To
Ticor's presumable dismay, thirty-three states disagreed.2 '5 The Solicitor
filings were either unchecked or checked merely for mathematical errors; that in Montana
a filing took effect without the filer's ever submitting requested information; and that in
Wisconsin a filing took effect while the filer waited seven years to comply with a request
for information. 112 S. Ct. at 2179.
12 Brief of Amicus Curiae states of Wisconsin et al. at I I n.9, Ticor.
2'1 For convenience, the text will refer only to the insurance company named in the case
caption.
21 Brief for Respondents at 39, Ticor.
. Why the states submitted this brief is an interesting question that will challenge histori-
ans. At least three tactors are worth exploring. First, briefs were filed largely by state
antitrust (not insurance) officials. Counsel of record was Kevin J. O'Connor, head of
Wisconsin antitrust enforcement. Assistant Attorney General O'Connor is actively inter-
ested in antitrust matters, generally with a plaintiff's perspective. See Kevin O'Connor, Law
anod Econoinics: Colluion or Synergy (The Case of Predation), in IssuEs AFTER A CENTURY OF
FEDERAL CoMi'ETrrION POLmcc 61 (Robert L. Wills et al. eds., 1987). Antitrust officials are
more likely to be hostile to exemptions for regulated industries than attorneys working for
the regulators.
Second, state and federal (especially FTC) antitrust officials have reestablished cordial
relations. State antitrust officials were delighted when President Bush's antitrust officials
evidenced much reduced hostility to the states. See 60 Minutes with Robert M. Langer, Chair
ofthe National Association of Attorneys General Multitate Antitrust Task Force, 61 ANTiTRUST
L.J. 211 (1992). The states had a healthy interest in nurturing this relationship. This interest
in harmony certainly had something to (to with the states' willingness to come forward at
the eleventh hour to support the Federal Trade Commission.
Finally, the states may not have been unmindful of their pending case against insurance
companies, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, Dkt. 91-1111 (U.S. certiorari granted Oct.
5, 1992), Merrett Underwriting Agency Mgt., Ltd. v. State of California, Dkt. 91-1128 (U.S.
certiorari granted Oct. 5, 1992). The principal focus of the case is on the McCarran-
Ferguson Act's insurance antitrust exemption, and the case raises important questions
concerning the extraterritorial reach of the antitrust laws, but the case also has a significant
state action element. Although "active supervision" is not a critical issue today, it could
become one on appeal; antitrust plaintiffs must worry, moreover, about rhetoric that might
be part of a defense victory.
[Vol. 61
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General observed that with the FTC and the States in agreement that
antitrust enforcement was essential, "only the foxes are insisting that they
were not left to guard the henhouse.,'26
The States' line of reasoning is not easy to understand. They claimed
that the Third Circuit had undermined, not honored, federalism. States
should be able "to regulate loosely or just monitor markets, relying on
competition to govern market conduct. ' 2  The court of appeals would
limit regulatory choices, the States said, by immunizing from antitrust
scrutiny "parties in many industries subjected to 'some basic level of
[regulatory] activity.' ,28
This is an odd argument. At its core is an assertion that rates in
Montana and Wisconsin are determined by competition rather than regu-
lation.29 Were this true, thefirst Midcal prong-clear articulation-would
not be satisfied, yet from the very beginning FTC complaint counsel
conceded that it was. :"0 Complaint counsel could hardly have done other-
wise, since Montana and Wisconsin statutes clearly authorize rating bu-
reaus to file rates and insurers to charge such rates.3' The States glossed
'6 Reply Brief for the Petitioner on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, Ticor.
17 Brief at 13. "[T]he Amici States ask no more than thai this Court protect rhe states'
right to adopt less-than-comprehensive regulatory schemes illa use competition as the key
component of regulatory policy." Id.
"8 Brief at 15 (quoting Ticor, 922 F.2d at 1136, in turn quoting New ELgland Motor Rate
Bureau, 908 F.2d at 1071).
2' Brief at 14 ("Thus, the regulatory schemes in place in Wisconsin and Montana (a)
provide for competition to determine the acrual level of rates and, consequently, (b) do not
provide for active oversight of the competitive price-setting process. Largely because of
this conscious state policy to use competitive markets to determine rates, Wisconsin and
Montana regulators adopted a 'hands-off" policy toward title insurance ... "). See also Brief
in Support of Petition for Certiorari at 3 ("The state regulatory regimes ,a issue here
explicitly direct that the insurance commissioners rely on the competitive marketplace
rather than regulate rates directly.") (footnote onitted).
'0 112 F.T.C. at 377 (initial decision) ("Complaint counsel concede that the joint rale
making activity by rating bureaus in six of the eight states (all except Pennsylvania and New
Jersey] ... was authorized by state law.").
"' Wisconsin: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 625.13(1) (1980) ("every rate service organization ...
which has been designated by any instrrer for Ihe filing of rates under § 625.15(2) shall file
with the commissioner all rates and supplementary rate information"); id. § 625.15(1)
(1980) ("An insurer may ... use rates and supplementary rate infornation prepared by a
rate service organization, with average expense factors determined by the rate service
organization ... "); id. § 625.15(2) (West Supp. 1991) ("An insurer may discharge its
obligation .. .by giving notice to the commissioner that it uses rates and supplementary
rate information prepared by a designated rate service organization .. The insurer's rates
and supplementary rate information shall be those filed from time to time by the rate
service organization ..., subject, however, to the modifications filed by the insurer.").
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-16-203(l) (1980) ("Every ... rating organization ...
shall file with the commissioner all rates intended for use within the state, together with
supportingdata sufficient to substantiate such filing."); id. § 33-16-303(l) (1980) ("Members
19931
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over these authorizations, characterizing the Montana and Wisconsin
regulatory schemes as relying "on the competitive marketplace to deter-
mine prices. 3 2 With the schemes so characterized, the States argued that
"[uipholding immunity ... would limit the ability of states to choose
regulatory policies that rely on competitive markets, rather than perva-
sive regulation, to determine prices.
'[he States persuaded six Justices: 4
The respondents contend that principles of federalism justify a broad
interpretation of state-action immunity, but there is a powerful refuta-
tion of their viewpoint in the briefs that were filed in this case. The state
of Wisconsin,joined by Montana and 34 other states, has filed a brief as
amici curiae on the precise point. These States deny that respondents'
broad immunity rule would serve the States' best interests. We are in
agreement with the amici submission.
If the States must act in the shadow of state-action immunity whenever
they enter the realm of economic regulation, then our doctrine will
impede their freedom of action, not advance it .... By adhering in most
cases to fundamental and accepted assumptions about the benefits of
and subscribers of rating or advisory organizations may use the rates ... either consistently
or intermittently, but ... shall not agree with each other or rating organizations or others
to adhere thereto.").
2" Brief at 2. The following two statutory provisions were cited in support of this claim:
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 625.11(1) (1980) ("Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly
discriminatory, nor shall an insurer charge any rate which if continued will have or tend
to have the effect of destroying competition or creating a monopoly."); and MONT. ConE
ANN. § 33-16-201(1)(b) (1991) ("No rate shall be held to be excessive unless such rate is
unreasonably high for the insurance provided and a reasonable degree of competition does
not exist in the area with respect to the classification to which such rate is applicable.").
'' Brief at 2. Four states argued that federalism called for affirming the Third Circuit,
although their brief did not criticize the briefs of their fellow states. Brief of Amici States
California, Colorado, Nebraska and South Dakota in Support of Respondents. Ticor must
have taken modest comfort, at best, from California's arguing that Montana and Wisconsin
actively supervised, when Montana and Wisconsin disagreed.
"'Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court was joined by Justices White, Blackmun,
Stevens, Scalia, and Souter. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, in an opinion joined by
J ustices O'Connor and Thomas. Justice O'Connor filed a separate dissent in which Justice
Thomas joined.
There is irony in justice Kennedy being the author of the FTC victory. In Llewellyn v.
Crothers, 765 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1985), then-Judge Kennedy wrote a unanimous opinion
finding state action immunity for officials and an insurance fund involved in Oregon's
workers' compensation system. The opinion's hymn in praise of federalism was cited
regularly by Ticor and its allies. E.g., Brief for Respondents at 25-26, Ticor (quoting and
noting author), at 29; Brief of Amici States California, Colorado, Nebraska and South
Dakota in Support of Respondents at 14, Ticor (quoting and noting author); Brief for
Hartford Fire Insurance Co., et al., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18.
The United States's first three briefs ignored the case; their last brief mentioned it in a
footnote distinguishing various lower court cases cited by respondents. Reply Brief for
Petitioner at n. 10, Ticor.
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competition within the framework of the antitrust laws, we increase the
States' regulatory flexibility.3"
This analysis is quite beside the point of the dispute between the FTC
and the insurance companies. 6 The statutes at issue here would have
conferred immunity had regulators been more vigorous. Yet the States
argued that an FTC victory ironically could advance federalism interests;
and, seemingly, a majority of Justices were persuaded.37
C. THE DISSENTS
The ChiefJustice and Justice O'Connor each filed a dissenting opinion.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent joined by Justices O'Connor and
Thomas, worried that private parties will be unlikely to participate in
negative option regulation where liability may result from insufficiently
active regulation. Chief Justice Rehnquist championed the court of ap-
peals's test, and worried about antitrust review of the "efficacy of a
particular State's regulatory scheme."' 8 Justice O'Connor's dissent, in
which Justice Thomas joined, protested that the "Court had created an
impossible situation for those subject to state regulation.""
The dissents may be right.40 Negative-option regulation, in which rates
take effect unless rejected, is not for the faint-hearted regulated firm if
the firm cannot know in advance whether regulators will be sufficiently
active to confer immunity.4' The majority sought to limit its holding to
35112 S. Ct. at 2178.
36 The States' novel argument that federalism would be advanced by denying immunity
appears to be absent from the FTC's opinion, the FTC's briefs in the Third Circuit, and
the United States's petition for certiorari. The United States's Reply Brief, however, devoted
two pages to rebuffing Ticor's federalism claims by reviewing the "decidedly contrary view
of federalism" that was "powerfully set forth" in the States' brief. Reply Brief at 8-9. See
also Brief for the Petitioner [United States] at 22 (arguing that court of appeals's standard
would limit state regulatory options).
" Shortly after deciding Ticor the Court vacated and remanded for further consideration
U.S. Metroline Servs., Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 947 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1991).
112 S. Ct. 2987 (1992).
31 112 S. Ct. at 2182-83.
39 Id. at 2183 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
4 But cf. Yeager's Fuel, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., Nos. 91-5176, 92-2359,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15260 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 1992) (utility's heat pump incentives found
immune; supervision through conservation bureau of public utility commission sufficient);
Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Mgt., Inc., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 69,984 (D. Me.
Sept. 23, 1992) (immunity where county performed supervision); Sandy River Nursing
Care Center v. National Council on Compensation Ins., 1992-1 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
69,885, (D. Me. 1992) (sufficient supervision where annual rate hearing approved less-
than-requested increases).
"' In his final word on the subject the Solicitor General conceded that private parties may
be in jeopardy where there is no written record, but he was unmoved. "Absent such a
1993]
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price-fixing cases,' 2 but "price-fixing" can be seen as including agree-
ments on specific prices, agreements on bidding arrangements or pricing
schemes, horizontal allocation of customers or territories, and even some
forms of standardization-in other words, most of the activities likely to
be subject to this kind of regulation.
D. THE CONCURRENCE
Most candid of all was the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia. He
agreed with the dissenters that regulated individuals and firms will be at
risk because they will find it difficult to know in advance that they are
exempt. This uncertainty is acceptable, he said, because it is an inevitable
consequence of the Midcal "active supervision" doctrine, and because he
is "skeptical about the Parker v. Brown exemption for state-programmed
collusion in the first place. '
It is revealing that justice Kennedy, for the Court, wrote that "state-
action immunity is disfavored, much as are repeals by implication."4
This is the first such reference in the more than half dozen cases since
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co."' Neither the Solicitor General nor
supporting amici made this claim. Such a statement is quite remarkable,
coming as it does only a year after the courts decided Omni. Not only is
this idea missing from Omni; the whole thrust of Omni is to promote
federalism and highlight the state action exemption as an important
bulwark of federalism. The Court's opinion in Ticor can be seen as sug-
gesting a new, more confrontational approach to federalism-federalism
record, there is no reason why private parties should not bear the burden of contacting
state authorities to determine whether their conduct has been approved." Reply Brief for
the Petitioner, text at n.1 0, Ticor.
12 112 S. Ci. at 2180:
This case invoilves horizontal price fixing under a vague imprimatur in Form and
agency inaction in fact. No antitrust offense is more pernicious than price fixing.
... Our decision should be read in light of the gravity of the antitrust offense,
the involvement of private actors throughout, and the clear absence of state
supervision. We do not imply that some particular form of state or local regulation
is required to achieve ends other than the establishment of uniform prices. [citing
City of Columbia v, Omni Advertising, Inc., Il1 S. Ct. 1344 (1991)].
112 S. Ct. at 2180 (Scalia, j., concurring). Justice Scalia was referring to the original
state action case, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
"" 112 S. Ct. at 2178.
-15 435 U.S. 389, 398-99 (1978) (Brennan,J.,joined, for this part of the opinion, by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens). justice Kennedy cited this part
of City of Lafayette. f. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S.
48, 67-68 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Implied antitrust immunities, however, are
disfavored, and any exemptions from the antitrust laws are to be strictly construed.")
(citations omitted).
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as a sword instead of a shield. "States," wrote the Court, "must accept
political responsibility for actions they intend to undertake."4
In other words, Justice Scalia is right, too.
I1. MORALES V. TWA
The airfare wars triggered by deregulation excited some and troubled
others. Among those troubled were many state attorneys general. They
perceived an important mission for the states. In views explained in a
petition for certiorari in Morales v. TWA, many state attorneys general
believed that "[sltate regulation of airfare advertising plays an essential
role in ensuring efficient functioning of the marketplace. '47 Although the
Department of Transportation (DOT) is authorized to prevent "unfair or
deceptive practices ... in air transportation or the sale thereof,"' state
regulation is necessary because, according to the petition, "[u]nfortu-
nately, the Department is not doing its job"4 and "needs all the help it
can get in policing advertising."5
Perhaps not surprisingly, DOT thought it was doing its job and did not
need any help. DOT opposed the states' proposals as inconsistent with
federal policy and preempted by federal law. The Federal Trade Com-
mission warned that the states were likely to lessen the vigor of price
competition and harm rather than help consumers."
The states proceeded, nonetheless, to issue in December 1987, "Guide-
lines for Air Travel Advertising." The Guidelines' authors, conscious
of the preemption risks they were running, sought to regulate airline
advertising without appearing to issue regulations. The Guidelines were
"not an attempt at rulemaking and should not be considered as such,"
according to an executive summary.52 But the Guidelines were "intended
16 112 S. Ct. at 2178 ("Federalism serves to assign political responsibility, not to obscure
it. . . . [O]ur insistence on real compliance with both parts of the Midcal test will serve to
make clear that the State is responsible for the price fixing it has sanctioned ... ").
17 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th
Circuit at 10.
18 49 U.S.C. § 1381(a) (1988).
'9 Petition at 11.
0 Petition at 13. See also NAAG Adopts Premerger Compact, Air Travel Ad Practices Guidelines,
53 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 927, 927-28 (Dec. 17, 1987) (reporting that Texas
Attorney General Jim Mattox "lamented" that federal agencies "have failed to act, and the
states must move into this enforcement vacuum and do something to police abuses").
" Federal opposition is summarized in Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 5-6, Morales.
52 Guidelines for Air Travel Advertising Adopted on December 12, 1987 by the National
Association of Attorneys General, 53 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1345, at S-
2 (executive summary). See also Guidelines, 53 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at S-7
("It is important to note that these Guidelines do not create any new laws or regulations
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to express the general enforcement policies of the states,"5 to be "a
restatement of what is currently illegal under the laws of the various
states," and "to advise the airline industry what conduct is permitted and
what is prohibited"5 4-although "individual attorneys general may still
vary or supplement these Guidelines."55
The Guidelines were incredibly detailed, taking up fourteen pages in
the Supreme Court Reporter.56 They did not sit long on the shelf unused.
In February 1988 the attorneys general of seven states, including
Texas, issued a formal "advisory memorandum," directed to airlines and
others, that began as follows: "Recently, it has come to our attention
that although most airlines are making a concerted effort to bring their
advertisements into compliance with the standards delineated in the
National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) guidelines for fare
advertising, many carriers are still factoring $23 out of the price adver-
regarding the advertising practices or other business practices of the airline industry. They
merely explain in detail how existing state laws apply to air fare advertising and frequent
flyer programs.").
5' Id.
51 See also Guidelines, supra note 52, at S-5 ("The purposes of the Guidelines ... are to
reduce the apparent consumer confusion, to advise the airline industry what advertising
and marketing practices are acceptable under state law throughout the United States, and
to protect consumers from deceptive and misleading practices without the necessity of
protracted litigation.").
55 Id.
-'6 112 S. Ct. at 2041-54. The Court summarized the Guidelines as follows, id. at 2038-
39:
Taking them seriatim: § 2.1, governing print advertisements of fares, requires
"clear and conspicuous disclosure [defined as the lesser of one-third the size of
the largest typeface in the ad or ten-point type] of restrictions such as" limited
time availability, limitations or refund or exchange rights, time-of-day or day-of-
week restrictions, length-of-stay requirements, advance-purchase and round-trip-
purchase requirements, variations in fares from or to different airports in the
same metropolitan area, limitations on breaks or changes in itinerary, limits on
fare availability, and "[any other material restriction on the fare." Section 2.2
imposes similar, though somewhat less onerous, restrictions on broadcast adver-
tisements of fares; and § 2.3 requires billboard fare ads to state clearly and conspic-
uously "Substantial restrictions apply" if there are any material restrictions on the
fares' availability. The guidelines further mandate that an advertised fare be
available in sufficient quantities to "meet reasonably foreseeable demand" on every
flight on every day in every market in which the fare is advertised; if the fare will
not be available on this basis, the ad must contain a "clear and conspicuous
statement of the extent of unavailability." § 2.4. Section 2.5 requires that the
advertised fare include all taxes and surcharges; round-trip fares, under § 2.6,
must be disclosed at least as prominently as the one-way fare when the fare is only
available on round trips; and § 2.7 prohibits use of the words " 'sale,' 'discount,'
[or] 'reduced' " unless the advertised fare is available only for a limited time and
is "substantially below the usual price for the same fare with the same restrictions."
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tised for international flights."57 The memorandum quoted Guideline
2.5, which prohibited the practice.5 The memorandum continued by
saying that failure to include nonoptional costs in advertised prices vio-
lated state laws, and asked for assurances of compliance by February 10,
so the attorneys general could avoid "initiating any immediate enforce-
ment actions." 59
A month later DOT wrote the Texas Attorney General and reiterated
its view that state involvement in this issue was "clearly preempted by
Federal law."6 ° With respect to advertising not using total prices, and
advertising using one-way fares (which DOT had heard also was of
concern to the state attorneys general), DOT "specifically permitted the
type of advertising to which the Attorneys General object."'"
In November 1988 the Attorney General of Texas, speaking for five
states,62 gave three major airlines "formal notice of intent to sue," and
threatened suit if after November 30 the airline advertised a fare that
did not include within it "any fuel, tax, or other surcharge., 63 Without
waiting to be sued, the airlines struck first and won a preliminary injunc-
tion barring enforcement action.64
The question was the scope of preemption by the Airline Deregulation
Act. Section 105(a)(1) of that Act provides that "no State ... shall enact
or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having
the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any
air carrier" regulated by DOT.65 The deceptively simple question was
whether what the state attorneys general were doing was "relating to
rates."
"' Memorandum from Attorneys General of Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri,
New York, Texas, and Wisconsin, to Airlines and other interested parties, at 1, 3 (Feb. 3,
1988), Morales App. 123a, 125a.
"' Guidelines 2.5 provides as follows: "Any fuel, tax, or other surcharge to a fare must
be included in the total advertised price of the fare."
9 Memorandum at 3, Morales App. 125a.
I0 Letter from B. Wayne Vance, DOT General Counsel, to Jim Mattox, at 1 (Mar. 2,
1988), Morales App. 126a.
61 Id. at 2, Morales App. 127a.
612 California, Massachusetts, New York, Texas, and Washington.
63 E.g., Letter from Stephen Gardner, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, to John
Bloodworth, Director of Advertising and Sales Promotion, Pan American World Airways,
at 1, 4 (Nov. 14, 1988); Morales J.A. 125a, 128a.
64 TWA v. Mattox, 712 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd, 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 308 (1990), permanent order aff'd, 949 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1991), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
6549 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (1988).
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There was disagreement about the objectives of the attorneys general.
Attorney General Morales's Petition for Certiorari never mentioned the
word "guidelines"; it asked whether airlines can "falsely advertise air
fares in Texas, in total disregard of state law prohibitions."" Morales
portrayed the threatened action as a routine attempt to enforce state law.
In fact, Morales, in the first heading of his Reply Brief, declared, "The
NAAG guidelines are irrelevant to this case....7
A. JUSTICE SCALIA'S OPINION
The attempted recharacterization was unavailing. DOT joined the side
of the airlines. The Acting Solicitor General argued that DOT and the
NAAG guidelines "embody diametrically different conclusions" concern-
ing the same advertising."8 During the oral argument of the Texas Assis-
tant Attorney General, Justice O'Connor queried, "But can you say that
advertisement of rates and fares does not relate to airline rates and
fares?, 6 9 With that question, Texas's case was lost.
The question that Justice Scalia, for the Court, addressed as he began
the heart of his opinion was "whether enforcement of the NAAG guide-
Petition for Certiorari, at Question Presented.
67 Reply Brief on the Merits at 1. Attorney General Morales insisted that the guidelines
had "neither the force nor the effect of law," but rather were "an extremely intormal
Restatement of Torts relating state consumer protection laws to airline practices." Id. at 7.
"; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 28, Morales.
See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari
at 11-12 (opposing certiorari on this issue); Brief of the American Ass'n of Advertising
Agencies, Inc., et al., as Anicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10-18, Morales
(extensive discussion of tension). The Acting Solicitor General pointed to DOT's proposal
to codify its enforcement policies concerning advertising of fares net of government-
imposed or approved charges, and advertising of one-way fares available only through
purchase of round-trip tickets, 54 Fed. Reg. 31,052 (1989). Ironically, petitioner Morales
seemed to agree. Although he wrote that Texas and federal law are "congruent" and "in
twain," Brief of Petitioner at 19, 27, he also complained that "DOT has consistently sided
with the airline respondents in opposing state regulation of airline advertising and by
permitting the exact practices which the state would prohibit," id. at 27. (To claim consis-
tency, Morales pointed to a CAB-adopted regulation, 14 C.F.R. § 399.84 (1992) (adopted
Dec. 20, 1984); when discussing opposition General Morales pointed to, among other
things, the DOT proposal to amend that regulation. Section 399.84 states that the "Board"
considers advertising to be unfair or deceptive whenever an adver.tised price is not "the
entire price to be paid by the customer to the air carrier, or agent, for such air transpor-
tation."
" State, Airline Wrangle in Supreme Court over Regulation of False Claioo on Fares, 62 Antitrust
and Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 286, 287 (Mar. 5, 1992). justice Kennedy also observed, "It's
really quite difficult to say that the guidelines at issue here do not relate to rates, routes,
and services." Id. Texas Assistant Attorney General Stephen Gardner responded, "But
we're not here to address the guidelines. It's a false issue." Id.
This response was unpersuasive. "As judge Easterbrook succinctly put it, compelling or
restricting '[p]rice advertising surely 'relates to' price.' " 112 S. Ct. at 2039, quoting Illinois
Corporate Travel v. American Airlines, Inc., 889 F.2d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 919 (1990).
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lines on fair advertising through a State's general consumer protection
laws is preempted by the ADA.""' As is so often the case, the question
answered itself (and a five-three majority agreed to the question and
answered in the affirmative). Any opinion that included fourteen pages
of the guidelines, as an appendix, was destined to find preemption. The
Court duly noted the tension between Texas and DOT, observing, "State
and federal law are in fact inconsistent here-DOT opposes the obliga-
tions contained in the guidelines, and Texas law imposes greater liabil-
ity."' 1 The Court said this tension was "beside the point" given the statu-
tory language,72 but the airlines clearly benefited from the vigorous
support of federal agencies from the beginning of the dispute through
oral argument.
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court merits study not only for its
outcome but also for its celebration of the economics of yield manage-
ment. "[I]t is clear as an economic matter that state restrictions on fare
advertising have the forbidden significant effect upon fares., 73 This is
not a simple matter of prohibiting falsehoods, he wrote. Instead, the
guidelines would "severely burden" airlines' ability to practice yield man-
agement, i.e., to "place substantial restrictions on the availability of the
lower priced seats" while simultaneously being "able to advertise the
lower fares. 7 4 Such marketing practices "ultimately redound to the bene-
fit of price-conscious travelers;,1 by interfering with them the guidelines
would have "a significant impact upon the fares they [airlines] charge. ,76
'o 112 S. Ct. at 2036.
71 Id. at 2038.
72 Id. at 2038. The question posed by the statute was whether the states' enforcement
efforts were "relating to rates, routes, or services." The Court relied on the "ordinary
meaning" of "relating to," which it (and the Acting Solicitor General) found in BLACK'S
LAw DIcTIONARY 1158 (5th ed. 1979), 112 S. Ct. at 2037; see Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12 n. 12. This meaning was bolstered by t series
of ERISA cases that had read the same words broadly, and concluded: "State enforcement
actions having a connection with or reference to airline 'rates, routes, or services' are pre-
empted .. " 112 S. Ct. at 2037.
The Court declined to say how far this standard would extend beyond the case before
it. 112 S. Ct. at 2040. Some connections would be more tenuous and the Court left for
another day the drawing of additional lines. Cf. Brief for the Respondent Airlines on Writ
of Certiorari at 23 (urging Court not to address issue of preemption of broader consumer
protection not directed at airlines); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents on Writ of Certiorari at 17 (limiting preemption to laws relating to rates,
routes, or services "in a manner implicating competition or the procompetitive policies of
the Deregulation Act").
71 112 S. Ct. at 2039 (emphasis added).
"4 Id. at 2040.75 Id.
76 Id. Justice Scalia wrote that the dissent disagreed that the effect would be significant,
a conclusion which "is unexplained, and seems to us inexplicable." Id. at 2040 n.3. The
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B. JUsTICE STEVENS'S DISSENT
Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Blackmun, disagreed. The disagreement is largely one of interpreting
the Airline Deregulation Act. Justice Stevens started with a
" 'presum[ption] that Congress did not intend to pre-empt areas of tradi-
tional state regulation.' "" This presumption, he argued, meant that
traditional state regulations are preempted only if they directly relate to
rates, routes, or services, unless Congress intended the preemption. He
found no such intention in the legislative history."
Supreme Court reversed in an unimportant respect. The trial court's order extended
beyond fare advertising, enjoining "any enforcement action ... which would seek to regu-
late or restrict any aspect of the individually named plaintiff airlines' air fare advertising
or the operations involving their rates routes and/or services." 712 F. Supp. at 102 (emphasis
added). The only threatened enforcement concerned fare advertising, so the Court vacated
the injunction insofar as it extended beyond that. 112 S. Ct. at 2036.
In the aftermath of Morales the Court vacated two opinions. In West v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit had permitted a state-law
challenge to overbooking to go forward; that court had limited the Airline Deregulation
Act's "relating to" language to situations where "the underlying statute or regulation itself
relates to airline services," i.e., "state laws that merely have an effect on airline services are
not preempted." 923 F.2d at 660. After denying certiorari a week after Morales was decided,
the Supreme Court reversed itself, vacated, and remanded for further consideration in
light of that case. 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992). (West was represented by Public Citizen and
Aviation Consumer Action Project, whose brief is discussed below at note 77.)
West's reasoning had been followed in American Airlines Inc. v. Wolens, 589 N.E.2d
533, 535 (I1. 1992), which ruled that the Airline Deregulation Act precluded a state-law-
based injunction action but not a damages challenge to a change in a frequent-flyer pro-
gram. Thisjudgment, too, was vacated. 61 U.S.L.W. 3219 (Oct. 5, 1992) (No. 92-249).
77 Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2055 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985)). The Court did not mention any such
presumption. The Acting Solicitor General addressed this presumption by saying it was
"plainly overcome by the express preemption provision," and, having been overcome,
should vanish and "not resurface at every turn." Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12 n.9.
In making this argument the Acting Solicitor General was responding not to petitioner
Morales, but rather to two amici. Public Citizen and Aviation Consumer Action Project
submitted an elegant brief that focused attention on this presumption and reviewed the
legislative history in detail. Their argunent, in brief, was that Congress had sought merely
to have airlines treated like other businesses (which are, of course, subject to state consumer
protection laws). A claimed presumption against preemption was highlighted in this brief
and in Brief of Thirty-One State Attorneys General Respondents in Support of Petitioner,
Dan Morales, on Writ of Certiorari at 7-9. Had Morales won, credit would have gone to
its amici.
Legal consistency was not advanced when, less than a month later, Justice Stevens again
discussed a "presumption against preemption," this time for the Court in the celebrated
cigarette-warning label preemption case, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608,
2618 (1992) (complete preemption not found in Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act's prohibition of state requirements of statements "relating to smoking and health").
Justice Scalia conctrred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, relying significantly
on his own opinion in Morales. 112 S. Ct. at 2632-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7"Justice Stevens said it was a mistake to follow interpretations fashioned in ERISA
preemption cases, since ERISA has a "unique provision" supported by considerations "that
have no parallel in other federal statutes." 112 S. Ct. at 2054-55.
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Going further, Justice Stevens said the airlines had failed to show even
that the guidelines "will have a significant impact upon the price ofairline
tickets."7 He launched an attack on Justice Scalia's use of economic
theory that echoed his more successful attack four days earlier in Kodak.
The "airlines' argument (which the Court adopts)"' concerning yield
management is merely a "theoretical argument" and "is not supported
by any legislative or judicial findings."'" Even if' "the Court's economic
reasoning is sound ... the airlines have not sustained their burden of
proving that compliance with the NAAG guidelines would have a 'sig-
nificant' effect on their ability to market their product and, therefore, on
their rates."8"
This is not the first time that Justices Scalia and Stevens have locked
horns over the proper role and teaching of economics. In Business Elec-
tronics Corp.,83 for instance, Justice Stevens criticized "the majority's total
reliance on 'economic analysis.' "8 Justice Stevens's concern about exces-
sive attention to economic theory is cousin to his criticism of Justice
Scalia's reluctance to trust juries with questions of motivation .15 In Mo-
rales, as in Business Electronics and the October 1990 term's City of Columbia
v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Justice Scalia won. In Kodak, however,
as in the October 1990 Term's Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas,8 ' Justice
Scalia lost.
III. EASTMAN KODAK CO. V. IMAGE TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC.
Kodak cannot be fully understood without knowing its unusual facts
and unique history. At issue was a three-level group of alleged markets:
79 112 S. Ct. at 2058.
"o Id. at 2058. The suggestion that the Court adopted the position of respondent airlines
is a little unfair. Respondent airlines did devote substantial attention to this subject. Brief
for the Respondent Airlines on Writ of Certiorari at 28-40. But the Acting Solicitor General
devoted as much or more attention to the subject, Brief for the United States as AmicuIs
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 18-23, and echoes of this brief can be seen more readily
in the Court's opinion. Moreover, the airlines relied heavily on an October 1, 1987, letter
from the Federal Trade Commission to California's deputy attorney general, as well as on
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WINDS OF CHANGE:
DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT SINCE DEREGULATION 89-92, 135 (1991).
8 112 S. Ct. at 2058-59.
1.2 Id. at 2059 (omitting footnote arguing that specific guidelines' provisions have not been
shown to be major hindrances).
"' Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (Stevens,,J., dissenting).
8' 485 U.S. at 756 (quoting Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court, 485 U.S. at 735).85 Justices Scalia and Stevens parted company on this and related issues in Business Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, Il l S.
Ct. 1842 (1991); and City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., I l1 S. Ct. 1344
(1991). Summit Health and Omni are reviewed in Calkins, supra note 17, at 610-37.
86 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991).
" Ill1 S. Ct. 1842 (1991).
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(1) photocopier and micrographic equipment; (2) parts for Kodak equip-
ment, some of which Kodak self-manufactured, some of which Kodak
acquired from vendors;8 and (3) service of Kodak equipment. The claim
that evolved, in essence, was that Kodak illegally tied parts and service,
and monopolized service and perhaps parts. (Neither the complaint nor
the opinions are models of clarity.) The factual underpinning of this
claim was Kodak's refusal to sell parts to independent service organiza-
tions (ISOs) such as the plaintiffs. 
8
1
A. BACKGROUND
Image Technical sued Kodak on April 14, 1987." ° Four months later
Kodak filed a motion for summary judgment. The issue, Kodak asserted,
was "one of law: whether an equipment manufacturer that lacks market
power in the relevant equipment market may choose not to sell replace-
ment parts to independent service firms."'" The key was the existence
of effective interbrand equipment competition: given that competition,
Kodak argued, it could not restrain competition or exert market power
" The parties sharply disputed which was more common. Kodak claimed it made 75%,
Official Transcript at 6-7; Image Technical claimed Kodak made only 10%, Official Tran-
script at 48. The disagreement provoked Justice Stevens to lament, "I always hate cases
where lawyers can't agree on what the record contains." Official Transcript at 50.
" There is dispute about the history of this policy. Kodak claimed its policy had been
consistent since it entered the photocopier business in 1975, and that it "never knowingly
sold copier parts to anyone who would use those parts to service someone else's Kodak
copier." Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment 18. See also Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 6 n.2. Image Technical
disagreed, asserting that Kodak sold ISOs parts for copiers until Kodak changed its policies
in 1985 or 1986 (the complaint uses inconsistent dates). Brief of Respondent at 4-5;
Complaint 36, 39. Both sides agreed that Kodak changed its policies for micrographic
equipment parts in 1985; but Kodak claimed the change was prospective only, for new
machines, Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits at 10, Official Transcript at 13-14, whereas
Image Technical seemed to claim that the policy was applied, at least in effect, to customers
with old machines as well, Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3. (As
J ustice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, Inage Technical had earlier seemed to agree that
ite policy was applied only to new sales, 112 S. Ct. at 2095, citing complaint and quoting
proffer below.)
"' Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. C 87 1686 WWS (N.D. Cal.
filed Apr. 14, 1987). Although the complaint was filed by 19 entities, for ease of discussion
we will consider the complaint to have been filed only by Image Technical.
' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment 21 (filed Aug. 14, 1987). Kodak explained:
[Tlhe purpose of this summary judgment motion is not to say, "No, we didn't do
it." For the most part, Kodak does refuse to sell replacement parts to plaintiffs,
and Kodak does place conditions on servicing resold Kodak equipment. The
purpose of this motion is to say, "Yes, these are our business practices, and they
are perfectly lawful."
Id. at 3.
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in any alleged service or other market. :2 On Image Technical's tying
claim, Kodak contended that it had not tied service to equipment, parts
to equipment, or equipment to parts, and that, in any event, there was
no tying violation because Kodak lacked market power in equipment
and, therefore, in parts. 3
After a September 11, 1987, status conference, Judge Schwarzer, a
noted authority on and aficionado of summary judgment,"' authorized
Image Technical to file one set of interrogatories (by September 25), one
set of requests for production of' documents, and (by September 25)
notices for four depositions. Additional discovery would be permitted
only by leave of the court.
The court authorized two additional depositions ("regarding the issue
of market power raised in defendant's motion for summary judgment")
on January 4, 1988.' 6 Additional discovery could be requested, the court
ordered, only pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, when Image Technical responded to the motion for summary
judgment. Image Technical filed such a request. It was denied April 18,
1988, when Judge Schwarzer granted summary judgment without a
hearing.
97
Judge Schwarzer bottomed his summaryjudgment on reasoning some-
what different from that suggested by Kodak." First, he ruled that there
Memorandum at 28. Perhaps the best statement of Kodak's position was in a footnote:
Plaintiffs' theory of the case is that Kodak used a by-product of its alleged monlop-
oly in Kodak equipment, its exclusive control of' Kodak parts, to monopolize the
service markets. If Kodak has no equipment monopoly, as the undisputed facts
demonstrate, then Kodak has no monopoly power to leverage into any other
market, including any service market.
Id. at 27 n.4. Foreshadowing a pattern it would follow at the Supreme Court, see infra
note 112, Kodak sometimes also argued that customers could consider service costs when
purchasing equipment, id. at 28, or that customers do consider service costs, Kodak's Reply
Memorandum at 6.
9" Memorandum at 38-42.
Kodak lacks any market power in the parts "market."... [Nlo such power exists
unless the defendant could raise prices or impose burdensome conditions on
consumers. But the undisputed evidence is that Kodak cannot do that on either
parts or service because customers could switch to competing equipment.
Id. at 41 (citations omitted).
" See, e.g., William Schwarzer, Surnrnary Judgment under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine
Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465 (1984).
15 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,402,
at 60,213 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (quoting order).
96 Id.
97 Id..
"Judge Schwarzer also expressed impatience with what he viewed as inefficient litigating:
The parties have filed 120 pages of briefs and voluminous supplementary material.
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was no tie at all.99 Second, he rejected the monopolization charge by
ruling that even if Kodak had market power in a market for servicing its
equipment, "plaintiffs have not come forward with any facts to suggest
that Kodak has attempted to leverage power in that market to gain
competitive advantage in another market."'00 Judge Schwarzer added
that Kodak has a "natural monopoly" in the market for Kodak parts, but
this natural monopoly "imposes no duty on it to sell to plaintiffs."''
Image Technical had complained of having only severely limited dis-
covery on " 'the important issues in the marketplace with regard to: 1)
relevant market; 2) market power; and competitive injury.' ,,I02 Judge
Schwarzer responded that Image Technical had failed to show how
this discovery would help it "cure the fatal deficiencies in their case."' '
Discovery would not contribute to determining whether a tie existed or
whether Kodak's business practices, which were "well known to plain-
tiffs," were lawful. 4
The Ninth Circuit reversed two to one. '5 The court wrote that Judge
Schwarzer had misunderstood that Kodak allegedly had tied parts to
service, notjust equipment and parts. 6 Kodak tied service to parts when
Kodak conditioned the receipt of parts on a promise not to purchase
service from ISOs.'1° As for monopolization, the freedom not to deal
Regrettably this occurred because the opening brief was filed during the absence
of the assigned judge who would not have permitted it. Because the briefs escaped
the discipline imposed by the Court's 25 page limitation, they are verbose, disorga-
nized, repetitive, overly argumentative and replete with immaterial matter, unnec-
essarily increasing the Court's burden. Counsel could have presented their case
far more effectively if they had taken the trouble to write concise briefs directed
to the issues.
Id. at 60,211 n. 1.
99 Id. at 60,212 ("Kodak does not require the buyer to agree to purchase parts or service
from Kodak. Nor does it condition the sale of one product on the buyer's purchase of
another product. A Kodak customer can buy equipment without having to buy parts; and
he can buy parts if he simply owns Kodak equipment."). The Court also ruled, apparently
responding in part to the tying claim, that there was no illegal conspiracy and thus no
violation of Sherman Act Section 1 or Clayton Act Section 3. Id. at 60,211-12.
'
0 Id. at 60,213.
1o1 Id.
102 Id. (quoting declaration).
]03 Id.
104 Id.
'0' Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co, 930 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Wiggins, J.). Judge Chambers joined the opinion. Judge Wallace dissented.
106 Id. at 615. In Judge Schwarzer's defense it should be noted that the complaint focused
principally on a tie to equipment. Complaint 58-59.
"' "A tying arrangement is 'an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the
condition that the buyer also purchase a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he
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with competitors has exceptions, and the court ruled that factual issues
were involved in deciding whether an exception applied." 8
The Ninth Circuit's opinion focused less on judge Schwarzer's decision
than on Judge Wallace's dissent, which picked up themes from Kodak's
motion that had not been addressed by Judge Schwarzer. Judge Wallace
made two arguments. On the Section 1 charge, he argued that without
power in the equipment market Kodak could not have power in the parts
market, and thus there was no tying violation.""' On monopolization,
Judge Wallace would have ruled for Kodak because he found legitimate
business justifications for Kodak's conduct."" The majority found this
reasoning attractive but not sufficiently compelling to justify summary
judgment.
The Supreme Court, like the Ninth Circuit, focused its attention on
Judge Wallace's arguments rather than Judge Schwarzer's reasons.'''
Kodak found itself championing a dissent, not a judgment. Any at-
tempted justification of summary judgment on new grounds risks seem-
ing jerry-built. Judge Wallace and Kodak could not withstand the com-
bined assaults of Judges Wiggins and Chambers, Image Technical (aided
in the Supreme Court by a new law firm), and a host of amici. Kodak is
now part of antitrust law, of course, and the opinion will take its place in
will not purchase that product from any other supplier.' " 903 F.2d at 615 (quoting Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)).
'0' 903 F.2d at 620 ("Applicants have presented sufficient evidence ... from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find that Kodak's implementation of its policies was anticompe-
titive, exclusionary, and involved a specific intent to monopolize.") (citation omitted).
'0 Id. at 623 ("a theoretical question is necessarily presented: is it possible to have power
in the derivative market for replacement parts without possessing power in the primary
interbrand market") (Wallace, J., dissenting). Judge Wallace answered in the negative,
relying heavily on Judge Posner's opinion in Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec.,
Inc., 866 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., dissenting).
" 903 F.2d at 623:
Kodak submitted extensive and undisputed evidence of a marketing strategy based
on high-quality service. Kodak alleges that independent service organizations
(ISOs) such as Image Tech may provide low-quality service, which will reflect
negatively on Kodak and undermine its quality-of-service strategy. According to
Kodak, the tying of replacement parts to service is used to police against poor-
quality service by the ISOs. To defeat a motion for summary judgment, Image
Tech, as the party with the burden of proof, was required to present evidence to
refute these allegations. It failed to do so.
(citation omitted).
. The Court devoted surprisingly little attention to Justice Scalia's dissent, mentioning
it briefly in two footnotes and discussing it at length (albeit great length) in only one. 112
S. Ct. at 2080 n.7, 2087 n.24, 2089 n.29. The Court's opinion, which summarizes Judge
Wallace's dissent in the text, 112 S. Ct. at 2079, is structured as a response tojudge Wallace
and his champions.
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casebooks. One has to wonder whether the outcome would have been
different had Judge Schwarzer's opinion been more like judge Wallace's
dissent, giving Kodak a stable foundation on which to build.
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
This discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion will review first tying
and then monopoly, and then consider the meaning of Kodak.
1. Tying
Kodak's principal tying argument was the one advanced by Judge
Wallace: "An equipment manufacturer that faces vigorous competition
from other manufacturers and that, accordingly, lacks interbrand market
power cannot have power-in any sense that should concern the antitrust
laws-in a wholly derivative aftermarket."... Without market power, ty-
"'1 Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 16. See also id. at 30-31 ("The dispositive fact in this
case, Kodak's lack of market power in the interbrand equipment market, was conceded."
Additional discovery would be "pointless. There is nothing that respondents could prove
that would overcome Kodak's conceded lack of market power."); id. at 22 ("Kodak's con-
ceded lack of market power in the equipment market dooms any attempt to extract
monopoly profits, even in allegedly 'imperfect' aftermarkets."). Kodak summarized its
argument as follows:
If Kodak raised its parts or service prices above competitive levels, potential
customers would simply stop buying Kodak equipment. Perhaps Kodak would be
able to increase short term profits through such a strategy, but at a devastating
cost to its long term interests. Thus, due to fierce competition in the interbrand
equipment markets, Kodak cannot exercise market power or act anticompetitively
in any derivative parts or service aftermarkets.
Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 12.
Kodak made much of what it claimed was an Image Technical concession in the court
of appeals that customers " 'can shun an equipment seller whose parts and service are
priced too high.' " Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 4 n. 1, 12, 17 (quoting Reply Brief of
Appellants [in court of appeals], J.A. 855). Often but not always Kodak linked its discussion
of this concession to its emphasis on Kodak's lack of market power in the equipment market.
(Kodak meant always to link the two but sometimes may have appeared not to because it
was speaking in shorthand, according to a Kodak lawyer. Daniel M. Wall, Kodak: A Personal
Perspective, 7 ANTrrRUST 4, 5 (Fall/Winter 1992)). Image Technical denied that it had made
any such concession. Brief of Respondent at 10. Kodak reasserted that it had. Petitioner's
Reply Brief on the Merits at 4. The much-controverted Image Technical sentence follows:
In the case at bar, the relevant inquiry is not the market faced by all prospective
equipment buyers, who can shun an equipment seller whose parts and service are
priced too high, but rather the market faced by current Kodak owners of relatively
expensive equipment, who on this record keep their equipment for its economic
life and do not and cannot economically switch, precisely as recognized in Dimidow-
ich [v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1986), modified, 810 F.2d 1517
(1987)].
The Supreme Court avoided the dispute, merely agreeing with the Solicitor General that
"Kodak 'cannot set service or parts prices without regard to the impact on the market for
equipment.' " 112 S. Ct. at 2084 n.17, quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 20.
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ing claims fail.'' 3
The Court, in an opinion byJustice Blackmun, disagreed with Kodak's
analysis." 4 Image Technical had offered evidence of market power by
showing that customers had been coerced into switching to Kodak service
from superior but less expensive ISO service, a process that had driven
ISO firms out of business.'5 The Court found Kodak's economics-based
attack on this evidence wanting as a matter of theory and of fact. Even
if competition in the equipment market is a constraint, Kodak can enjoy
at least some power in parts, and perhaps enough to support a tying
violation, the Court wrote. That Kodak cannot price parts without regard
to equipment sales does not prove it lacks pricing discretion; it is a "false
dichotomy" to assume that Kodak has to choose between competitive and
ruinous pricing.'"
... In its third Supreme Court brief, Image Technical claimed that Kodak had substantial
power in three narrower markets: high volume copiers, computer assisted retrieval systems,
and micrographic capture equipment. Brief of Respondent at 16-18, 32-33. Image Techni-
cal had earlier focused attention on the high volume copier business, but it had not disputed
"Kodak's assertion that it [Kodak] lacks market power in the interbrand markets." Image
Technical, 903 F.2d at 616 n.3; cf. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 2 ("Kodak
does not have a dominant share in either the market for photocopy or micrographic
equipment, but Kodak acknowledged below that it does have about 23% of the market
for high-volume photocopy machines, and somewhat less than 20% of the market for
micrographic machines."). Coudert Brothers was of counsel on plaintiffs' brief on the
merits but not its opposition to certiorari.
TheJustices were not pleased by this change of position. The minute Image Technical's
attorney said market power in equipment was "hotly debated," a Justice asked, "Excuse
me, why didn't you debate that in the response to the petition for certiorari? Because
frankly, I was not interested in considering whether there is market power in this primary
market. That's not the question we took this for." Official Transcript at 28. The attorney
was pressed on this point for what amounted to four pages of transcript. When he asserted
that the Court was "entitled to make a de novo review of the record," ChiefJ ustice Rehnquist
rejoined, "But what we're entitled to do ... is one thing. What we're willing to do may be
another." Official Transcript at 31.
The Court's opinion pointedly said the Court would proceed "based on the same premise
as the Court of Appeals, namely, that competition exists in the equipment market." 112 S.
Ct. at 2081 n. 10. It did this, it said, because a grant of certiorari is a commitment of scarce
resources, and "respondents failed to bring their objections ... to our attention in their
opposition to the petition for certiorari." 112 S. Ct. at 2081 n. I0.
' The Court said Kodak appeared to phrase its rule alternatively as a dispositive rule
of law and as a presumption satisfying its burden under Rule 56(c) summary judgment
requirements, 112 S. Ct. at 2082 n. 11; it rejected both. Justice Blackmun's opinion was
joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist andjustices White, Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter. Justice
Scalia filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas. Although the
Court peppered counsel with questions, Justice Blackmun asked no questions at all. Inter-
view with Daniel Wall, attorney for Kodak (Nov. 13, 1992).
11 112 S. Ct. at 2081.
... Kodak's lawyer twice conceded, during oral argument, that there may be less competi-
tion in parts than in equipment. Official Transcript at 9-10 ("QUESTION: Does your
argument about the original equipment market necessarily mean that there's the same
amount of competition in the parts market? MR. PICKETT: [T]he answer is no. ...
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Perhaps most interesting, the Court found that Kodak's theory may
not have accorded with market realities. The Court posited that if equip-
ment and service prices are interrelated, equipment sales should rise with
falling service prices. Yet the availability of inexpensive service caused
distress, not rejoicing, at Kodak; conversely, equipment sales did not
seem to fall after Kodak eliminated most inexpensive service."'
The Court observed that Kodak's theory may be prevented from work-
ing in practice by the existence of high switching and information costs.
Some customers are "locked in" to Kodak equipment by high switching
costs and arguably can be profitably exploited."' Even customers not
QUESTION: [Aire you saying as a matter of law.., there's an equal amount of competition
in the parts market? MR. PICKETT: No, no. I'm not saying that."). Similarly, Assistant
Attorney General Rill asserted it was "implausible" but not "impossible" for Kodak to
exercise market power in the parts market. Official Transcript at 21-22.
The Court dismissed Kodak's reliance on GTE Sylvania for the suggestion that interbrand
competition is a cure-all. That was a vertical case, the Court explained, and interbrand
competition protected consumers at every level. 112 S. Ct. at 2084-85 n.18. It remains to
be seen whether the Court's new thinking can be confined to horizontal cases.
,' 112 S. Ct. at 2085. The Solicitor General and, less directly, Kodak, suggested that a
firm might choose a strategy of spreading equipment costs over time by charging artificially
high prices for post-sale parts and service. Brief for the United States at 18; Petitioner's
Brief on the Merits at 18. At oral argument Kodak's lawyer agreed with Justice Scalia's
suggestion that Kodak was using an old approach, "[glive away the camera to sell the film."
Official Transcript at 17 (identification of Justice from 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 699 (Dec. 12, 1991)).
The Court pointedly responded that "Kodak never has asserted that it prices its equip-
ment or parts subcompetitively and recoups its profits through service." 112 S. Ct. at 2085.
Later, it said this point "bears repeating." Id. at 2088 n.26. Any such strategy, moreover,
"is inconsistent with Kodak's policy toward its self-service customers," which provide no
service revenues that could offset losses on equipment. Id. For a very similar argument, see
Brief of Bell Atlantic Business Systems at 26 ("Kodak itself has never claimed that it has
subcompetitively priced its equipment or parts. ... Indeed, such an argument is facially
inconsistent with the fact that Kodak allows its customers to service their own products.").
1"8 "[A] seller profitably could maintain supra-competitive prices in the aftermarket if the
switching costs were high relative to the increase in service prices, and the number of
locked-in customers were high relative to the number of new purchasers." 112 S. Ct. at
2087. Such a strategy is especially likely if Kodak can price-discriminate in favor of new
customers, and there was evidence that Kodak engages in some price discrimination (al-
though the Court did not explore whether Kodak discriminated between old and new
customers). Id.
The exact nature of this "lock-in" argument is not clear. Lock-in could refer to Kodak's
alleged ability to raise the price of parts or service to customers who purchased Kodak's
equipment knowing (or capable of knowing) Kodak would then have these customers at its
mercy; alternatively, it could refer to Kodak's ability to raise parts or service prices to
customers who bought equipment before Kodak changed its policies in 1985. As noted
above at note 89, the parties disagreed on whether this change was prospective. The Court's
factual recitation fit more comfortably with the latter scenario, but the Court never made
clear how it viewed these facts or which kind of lock-in effect concerned it. Justice Scalia
squarely subscribed to the prospective-only story, however, id. at 2095-96, and since the
Court discussed this part of his dissent without disagreeing with his factual recitation, the
Court may have agreed with Justice Scalia and Kodak on the facts but disagreed on their
consequences.
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locked in are vulnerable, according to the Court. Kodak claimed that
customers engage in life cycle costing,'"9 but life cycle costing is not easy
and some purchasers, such as government agencies, do not engage in
it.'12 Competitors cannot be relied upon to bring necessary information
to the market, because the market appears to be oligopolistic and there
is reason to doubt that competitors' self-interest would spur them to
improve customer pricing abilities.' 2' Finally, sophisticated purchasers
cannot be relied upon to protect the unsophisticated, as is often the case,
because Kodak practices price discrimination.12
Particularly interesting was the role played by amici. Amici, not Inage
Technical, referred to the authorities cited by the Court in its lock-in
"'' "[Aiggregate 'life cycle' costs are the tne economic costs of Kodak's equipment. Any
increase in parts or service prices necessarily increases life cycle costs and, therefore, has
the same effect as a direct increase in equipment costs." Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at
4 (citation omitted). Kodak also argued, as a fallback, that it prices its products with the
expectation that customers engage in life cycle costing. Petitioner's Reply Brief on the
Merits at 12 n.12.
""Justice Scalia protested that "we have never before premised the application of anti-
trust doctrine on the lowest common denominator of consuner." 112 S. Ct. at 2097 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
21 112 S. Ct. at 2086 & n.21. For a more Chicago School-based argument that Ihe use
of similar practices by competitors deserves attention, see Frank Easterbrook, Vertical
Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTItRUST L.J. 135, 161-63 (1984) (calling for
dismissal of challenges to vertical restraints unless engaged in by most market participants).
122 In particular, the most sophisticated customers service their own machines. Kodak is
willing to supply parts to these customers, but not to customers lacking this service capability,
which permits what could be effective price discrimination. 112 S. Ct. ai 2086-87. The
Court also noted that sophisticated customers do not prevent supracompetitive pricing if
their number is relatively small.
The role of sophisticated buyers brought forth soie sharp questioning during Assistant
Attorney General Rill's oral argument:
QUESTION [by Justice Stevens]: Well, what if only a few customers did it [life-
cycle price]. Would that make a difference?
MR. RILL: [T]here's no claim in this record that Kodak discriminated among
customers who made that assessment and did not make that ... assessment.
Kodak would be required, in the competitive equipment market, to price tlhe
total package competitively....
QUESTION: It would, if all the customers are fully informed.
MR. RILL: No, nojustice Stevens, the fact of the matter is thai the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that customers made that assessment. The fact that customers make
that assessment requires Kodak to behave competitively in the equipment market.
QUESTION: Did they tell us how many customers make that assessment, how
many-
MR. RILL: There's nothing in the record, justice Stevens, that tells us that-
QUESTION: You don't think that's relevant, either, I don't suppose.
Official Transcript at 23-24 (identification of Justice Stevens by a litigant). As the debate
continued, Justice Scalia contributed the "sharp cheese" theory: "Sharp cheese is very
expensive. My wife calls this the sharp cheese theory. You can always tell which cheese is
sharp. It's the one that costs more." Id. at 24-25 (identification of Justice by a litigant).
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discussion. ' Amici called attention to the authorities on which the Court
relied while discussing life cycle costing."2 4 An amicus, to a much greater
degree than Image Technical, argued that oligopoly may prevent com-
petitors from educating customers.12 1 Public purchasing officials came
forward to insist, moreover, that because statutes require competitive
bidding and governments often separate budget responsibility for pur-
chasing and operating, "Kodak's economic theory is largely irrelevant to
the real world of public purchasing."'"" Life cycle costing is "notoriously
difficult and imprecise," so only a bold purchasing official would prefer
future savings to a low initial cost.12 The Court cited the public purchas-
ers' brief and another amicus brief to support its doubts about the fre-
'The Court cited PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 519a
(1978), and F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 16-17 (3d ed. 1990). The first was cited only by Bell Atlantic Business Systems
Services, Inc., Brief at 21-22, the second only by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. et al., Brief at II n. 11. The Court's discussion closely parallels that of the Bell Atlantic
brief, although the same general arguments can be found in Image Technical's Brief of
Respondent at 20-22, 33-35.
12. The Court cited Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Con-
sumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U.L. REV. 661, 676 (1982), and Howard Beales, Richard Craswell
& Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Con.sumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491,
509-11 (1981). Both are cited on this point by State Farm, Brief at 9 n.8;. the first is also
cited by Bell Atlantic Business Systems, Brief at 17 n. 13. Image Technical referred to the
Craswell article in its opposition to certiorari, however (at 14), and the article was also cited
in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 n.24 (1986).
For its conclusion that it makes little sense to assume that equipment purchases are based
on valid information, the Court cited Steven C. Salop & Joseph Stiglitz, Bargains and Ripoffs:
A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion, 44 REV. ECON. STUDIES 493 (1977),
Steven C. Salop, Information and Market Structure-Information and Monopolistic Competition,
66 AM. ECON. REV. 240 (1976), and George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL.
EcoN. 213 (1961). The last two were cited by State Farm, Brief at 9 n.8, 12 n.13; the first
two were cited by Bell Atlantic Business Systems, Brief at 17. None was cited by Image
Technical.
The Court first explained that competitors may prefer themselves to charge supracom-
petitive prices, leaving customers in ignorance; the Court cited a discussion of "collective
monopolization," 2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 404(b)(1)
(1978). The same argument and citation are found in Brief for Bell Atlantic Business
Systems Services, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 18 ("in product markets
that are served by a few large sellers, the sellers may end up tacitly concluding that a
uniform practice of supercompetitive pricing would best serve all of them"). Consumers
may be left in ignorance even if there are many competitors, the Court then said, because
individual firms won't have incentives to educate consumers (to the benefit of their competi-
tors as well as themselves). The Court and a different amicus, but not respondent, relied
on Beales, Craswell, & Salop, supra note 124. See Brief for State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., et al., at 9 n.8. State Farm's brief stressed the importance of similar practices
by competitors, id. at 10-11. The argument was touched on only briefly in Respondents'
Supplemental Brief (on Petition for Certiorari) at 4.
"' Brief of Amici Curiae National Ass'n of State Purchasing Officials and National
Institute of Governmental Purchasing, Inc. in Support of Respondents at 8.
1"7 Id. at 8.
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quency with which customers engage in effective life cycle costing."" As
in Morales, a defendant painted a picture only to have its accuracy pro-
tested by a market participant.
2. Monopoly
Much of the Court's monopolization analysis followed from its tying
analysis. Both Kodak and the Solicitor General devoted most of their
briefs to the argument that competition in equipment prevented market
power in parts;'29 once the Court rejected that argument the game was
over. Kodak argued without conviction or success that a single brand of
product or service could not be a market. 130 Kodak was handicapped by
the district court's failure to discuss this issue except by saying that
Kodak's "natural monopoly" over parts does not impose a duty to deal.' 3
Kodak was facing something of an uphill struggle once the Court started
thinking in terms of a Kodak-dominated market.
The Supreme Court, as had the Ninth Circuit, squarely disagreed with
Judge Schwarzer's views on a monopolist's discretion. A monopolist does
not have an "absolute" right to refuse to deal with competitors, but can
do so "only if there are legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal.'
.28 112 S. Ct. at 2086. The Court also cited the brief submitted by 29 states, which
supported Image Technical but largely on legal grounds. A brief submitted by Public
Citizen, also in support of Image Technical, disagreed with Kodak's vision of how the world
of purchasing works. Image Technical's lawyer thought the brief so useful that he called
the Court's attention to it during oral argument. Official Transcript at 40.
'" Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 14-32; Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits at 6-
15; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10-26.
130 See 112 S. Ct. at 2090 ("in some instances one brand of a product can constitute a
separate market"). Although Kodak asserted briefly that a single brand cannot constitute
a market, Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 33-34, its principal tactic was to assume separate
markets for Kodak-brand parts and service but demonstrate that "firms constrained by
[interbrand] equipment competition cannot exercise market power in aftermarkets." Peti-
tioner's Reply Brief on the Merits at 14-15. See also Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 12,
16 & n.5; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9; Official Transcript at 12-13 (Kodak's lawyer
arguing that any parts and service market should be evaluated in connection with equipment
market). The Solicitor General assumed "for the sake of argument" that one manufacturer's
parts could constitute a market. Brief for the United States, as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 12 n.10.
Most courts have refused to find single-brand markets, ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTI-
TRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 206-07 (3d ed. 1992); e.g., Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime
Computer, Inc., 957 F.2d 1318, 1326-27 (6th Cir. 1992), vacated and remanded for reconsidera-
tion, No. 92-90 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1992), but the Supreme Court was unwilling to say that a
single brand can never be a market.
... 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 60,213.
132 112 S. Ct. at 2091 n.32. See also 903 F.2d at 620 ("A monopolist may not refuse to deal
with a competitor in an exclusionary attempt to impede competition without a legitimate
business reason.") (citations omitted).
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The Court then reviewed Kodak's proffered justifications with a highly
critical eye-an eye that may have been sharpened by one of the amicus
briefs.'
33
(1) Kodak claimed an interest in quality service and in concentrating
responsibility for equipment functioning. But there is evidence "that
ISO's provide quality service and are preferred by some Kodak equip-
ment owners." ' 34 The Court also rejoined that customers sophisticated
enough to engage in life cycle costing should be able to isolate responsibil-
ity for equipment malfunctioning,1 35 and that a manufacturer truly con-
cerned with concentrating responsibility would not permit self-service.'
36
(2) Kodak claimed an interest in controlling inventory costs. But break-
down rates should be the same regardless of the servicer's identity,
3 7
and concern about inventory costs would not justify preventing Kodak's
suppliers from also supplying ISOs.
(3) Kodak claimed an interest in discouraging free-riding. But the
Court's previous expressions of concern about free-riding sought to en-
courage investment in the down-stream market (here, service). There
was no claim of free-riding on Kodak's investment in service; rather,
Kodak was complaining because ISOs failed to enter the equipment and
parts markets. The Court viewed the ability to enter only one market as
something deserving of protection rather than condemnation. 138
'". For a short appraisal of the Court's discussion, see infra, text accompanying notes 173
& 174.
'"" 112 S. Ct. at 2091. The Court cited two venerable cases that had rejected similar good-
will arguments: IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936), and International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947).
135 112 S. Ct. at 2091:
... Kodak simultaneously claims that its customers are sophisticated enough to
make complex and subtle lifecycle-pricing decisions, and yet too obtuse to distin-
guish which breakdowns are due to bad equipment and which are due to bad
service. Kodak has failed to offer any reason why informational sophistication
should be present in one circumstance and absent in the other.
For a very similar argument see Brief for Bell Atlantic, as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 25 (Kodak's "basic argument is that these same customers are sophisticated
enough to make complex and subtle lifecycle-pricing decisions and thereby prevent Kodak
from taking advantage of its monopoly. There is no reason why informational sophistication
should be present in one circumstance and absent in another.").
116 112 S. Ct. at 2091. This argument, too, was set out by Bell Atlantic, Brief at 25.
"' 112 S. Ct. at 2091: "Presumably, the inventory of parts needed to repair Kodak
machines turns only on breakdown rates, and those rates should be the same whether
Kodak or ISOs perform the repair." Compare this with the Bell Atlantic Brief at 25: "The
simple fact is that the inventory of parts needed to repair Kodak machines should turn
only on breakdown rates. Those rates should be the same whether Kodak does the repair
or ISOs do it."
... 112 S. Ct. at 2091-92; cf. Brief of Bell Atlantic at 25-26 (similar but not identical
argument).
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Since none of Kodak's claimed justifications were sufficient as a matter
of law, summary judgment was deemed inappropriate.
C. THE MEANING OF KODAK
It is easy to dismiss Kodak as a discovery case. The Supreme Court was
clearly surprised at the speed with which a sophisticated plaintiff, with a
seemingly plausible story, had been tossed out of court.' 9 The summary
judgment motion had been filed four months after the complaint. Discov-
ery was limited, and the trial court never ruled that there was adequate
discovery on the issues that turned out to be dispositive. Judge Schwarzer
had ruled that any possible need for additional discovery on the market,
market power, and competitive injury was unnecessary because the plain-
tiff deserved to win on other grounds.40 When the court of appeals and
later the Supreme Court disagreed with his reasoning, finding that there
was a tie and that there was no absolute freedom to refuse to deal, these
issues became important. Kodak had to defend itself without benefit of
findings on the important questions. These features of Kodak mean that
the case will almost always be distinguishable.
Although easily distinguishable in the future, Kodak is part of antitrust
law and supports several important propositions. Its teachings must be
taken with an eye on the case's unusual facts and unique procedural
history; but its precepts cannot be ignored.
1. Summary Judgment
The critical moment in the Kodak saga came at the very beginning of
the oral argument of James Rill, Assistant Attorney General, arguing as
139 The Court ended its decision by observing that although Kodak may well prevail on
the merits at trial for any of several reasons, the Court "cannot reach these conclusions as
a matter of law on a record this sparse." 112 S. Ct. at 2092.
During oral argument, Justice Kennedy responded to Kodak's lawyer's description of
competition by asking whether this was "a law of nature or a law of economics." When the
lawyer said it was "certainly a law of economics," Justice Kennedy continued: "Because this
case comes up to us after very little discovery. And it just seems hard for me to ... imagine
... writing an opinion setting forth all the propositions you make, without some factual
support. ... ." Official Transcript at II (identification of Justice Kennedy by a litigant).
Later, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed to Assistant Attorney General Rill that "there is
a certain amount of very theoretical approach to your presentation, that this is the way the
market is going to behave, without any real, empirical evidence, it seems to me." Official
Transcript at 25. He agreed that Assistant Attorney General Rill's argument was "very
logical," but said he was "still not totally persuaded that there wasn't something in what the
Ninth Circuit said. How can we know, at this stage, that this is the way it would work out
in practice?" Id. at 25-26.
140 See supra, text accompanying notes 102-04. See also 903 F.2d at 617 n.4 ("The district
court permitted only very limited discovery on the market power issue .... Not finding it
necessary to reach the market power issue in its decision, the district court, of course, had
no reason to grant this request [for additional discovery on market power].").
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amicus curiae supporting Kodak. Rill opened his argument by asserting
that
when a plaintiff, seeking to avoid summary judgment, attempts to put
forward an implausible argument, or argument based on an implausible
theory, it is required under rule 56 and under this Court's decision in
the Matsushita case,' 4' to come forward with particularly persuasive,
probative, and substantial evidence in support of a cogent theory of
antitrust liability.1
4
2
Chief Justice Rehnquist immediately interrupted: "You say then that
Matsushita ... laid down a different rule as to summary judgment for
antitrust cases than prevails in the rest of the legal area?"'14 3 If there
was any doubt before Kodak, there is no longer. 44 Matsushita "did not
introduce a special burden on plaintiffs facing summary judgment in
antitrust cases .... Matsushita demands only that the nonmoving party's
inferences be reasonable in order to reach the jury, a requirement that
was not invented, but merely articulated, in that decision."'1
45
This is one reading of Matsushita, but not the most common one. In
Matsushita the Court wrote that "if the factual context renders respon-
dents' claim implausible-if the claim is one that simply makes no eco-
nomic sense-respondents must come forward with more persuasive
evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary. ,46
Many courts have viewed this as a license for the trial court to examine
plaintiffs' theories critically at early stages of litigation. 47 Matsushita em-
boldened courts to address the merits at early stages; Kodak cautions
against excessive enthusiasm. This caution is evident not just in Kodak's
result and language, 4' but also in the lower court cases the Supreme
Court cited with apparent approval. 4 Even small shifts of attitudes
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
', Official Transcript at 19.
1:3 Id. The questioner was identified by one of the lawyers present.
... Nor did Assistant Attorney General Rill argue that there was. He responded in the
negative, although he went on to add that in antitrust cases summary judgment can be
"particularly appropriate." Official Transcript at 20.
For background on summary judgment and antitrust see Stephen Calkins, Summary
Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust
System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065 (1986); Susan De Santi & William Kovacic, Matsushita: Its Construc-
tiont and Application by the Lower Courts, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 609 (1990).
'* 112 S. Ct. at 2083 (footnote omitted).
475 U.S. at 587.
''7 See De Santi & Kovacic, supra note 144.
'4 See supra, note 139 and text accompanying note 145.
'' Of the lower court cases cited by the Court, two reversed or reversed in substantial
part awards of summary judgment. Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. Budd Baer, Inc., 826
F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1987); Instructional Systems Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
[Vol. 6 1
SUPREME COURr ANTITRUST 1991-92
toward summary judgment are important, moreover, given the fre-
quency with which responses to such motions decide antitrust claims.'15
B. TING
Kodak affects two aspects of tying law in addition to those noted above.
First, Image Technical made the requisite showing of market power in
significant part with evidence that Kodak raised prices and exclded
competition in the tied (service) market. The typical tying case treats
market share as the primary indicator of market power. In Kodak the
Court looked equally to effects: "It is clearly reasonable to infer that
Kodak has market power to raise prices and drive out competition in the
aftermarkets, since respondents offer direct evidence that Kodak did
817 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1987); see 112 S. Ct. at 2083 n. 14. Arnold Pontiac has been cited as
an unusual case because it seemed to regard it as sufficient, to avoid summary judgment,
that there was a "plausible motive" to conspire (there, for a group of dealers to agree to
pressure a manufacturer to deprive a rival of a dealership), 826 F.2d at 1339; see De Santi
& Kovacic, supra note 144, at 640 (criticizing case). In Instructional Systems, as the Supreme
Court's parenthetical notes, it was sufficient that the defendants "could reasonably have
been economically motivated," 817 F.2d at 646, quoted in 112 S. Ct. at 2083 n. 14.
Although the Court does not mention the case, the Kodak opinion also contains some
limited support for a distinction that benefited plaintiffs in a controversial Ninth Circuit
decision, In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906
F.2d 432, 439 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2274 (1991). Petroleum Products limited Matsuohi-
ta's special solicitude for summary judgment to cases which, if successful, "would have the
effect of deterring significant procompetitive conduct." Under Petroleum Products, "the trial
court must consider whether ... the protection of innocent independent conduct outweighs
the costs associated with the potential decrease in strict antitrust enforcement. If it does,
then the plaintiff must come forward with additional, 'sufficiently unambiguous'
evidence .. " 906 F.2d at 439.
Without citing Petroleum Products, the Kodak Court ended its opinion with words closely
echoing that approach: "In this case, when we weigh the risk of deterring procompetitive
behavior by proceeding to trial against the risk that illegal behavior go unpunished, the
balance tips against summary judgment." 112 S. Ct. at 2088-89. The Court cited a part of
Matsushita that can be read as favoring a balancing approach; now plaintiffs are sure to
read Kodak as supporting a balancing approach.
Petroleum Products had been highlighted in the brief filed by 29 states, which also was the
only brief to cite Arnold Pontiac, Brief Amicus Curiae States of Ohio, et al. at 14. (No brief
cited Instructional Systems.) (It should be noted, however, that the Kodak Court did not follow
the states' suggestion to limit Matsushita to cases where there is no direct evidence.)
"5"Kodak's discussion of summary judgment has already been relied upon by lower
courts. The Third Circuit, in particular, has reversed summaryjudgment in a dealer boycott
case. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North Am., Inc., 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,918
(3d Cir. 1992) (Mansmann, J.). Big Apple contended that it had been denied franchises
because of a conspiracy among rival dealers and BMW. The district court granted surmmairy
judgment under Matsushita. The Third Circuit reversed, criticizing the district court for
compartmentalizing evidence and requiring Big Apple to prove too much. Citing Kodak,
the court said it is defendants' task to show that "an inference of concerted action ... is
unreasonable." Id. at 68,391-92.
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so.""'s' Although the Court's opinion appeared to conclude that there
could be a Kodak-dominated market for Kodak parts, 152 the Court largely
limited its discussion of market share to a rejection of Kodak's argument
that relatively modest equipment market shares should prevent liabil-
ity. 53 There is nothing remarkable about finding liability in part by
looking at anticompetitive results, if that is what the Court did; but the
Court's discussion is somewhat reminiscent of the old tying cases which
went almost so far as to find power from a successful tie. 5 4 Kodak did not
make clear how the Court would approach a tying case with similar effects
evidence but without supporting market share evidence,
Kodak also merits reflection for what it says, or, rather, does not say,
about the per se tying rule. The opinion opened by stating the tying rule
as a simple, three-part test: Section 1 of the Sherman Act is violated by
'5" 112 S. Ct. at 2088. See also id. at 2081 (discussing effects evidence), 2083 (Kodak bears
the "substantial burden" of showing "that despite evidence of increased prices and excluded
competition, an inference of market power is unreasonable"). An intriguing footnote
accompanies the sentence quoted in the text: "Cf. Instructional Systems, 817 F.2d at 646
(finding the conspiracy reasonable under Matsushita because its goals were in fact achieved)."
112 S. Ct. at 2088 n.25. The question in Instructional Systems was whether a competitor had
been driven out of business by fair means or foul. The Tenth Circuit distinguished the
then-recent Matsushita case in part because in Instructional Systems the "alleged goal" of the
conspiracy had been achieved, although principally because the plaintiff had produced
direct evidence of conspiracy and evidence of motivation.
15, See supra note 130.
153 Image Technical argued that any lack of market power in equipment markets was
"beside the point." The issue, it said, was whether Kodak had sufficient power in parts to
force the purchase of service, and there was at least sufficient evidence of such forcing to
require a trial. It reasoned that under Jefferson Parish per se treatment is justified "if the
existence of forcing is probable," 466 U.S. at 15, so "once a showing of actual forcing has
been made, it is no longer necessary to show the mere likelihood of forcing as a result of
market power.'" Brief of Respondent at 40 & n.27 (citing, with a "cf.," FTC v. Indiana
Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986)).
151 In Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958), the Court ruled that
"[t ]he very existence of this host of tying arrangements is itself compelling evidence of the
defendant's great power, at least where, as here, no other explanation has been offered for
the existence of these restraints." That Court also explained that it did not construe an
earlier decision's talk about "monopoly power" or "dominance" "as requiring anything
more than sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable restraint on free competi-
tion in the tied product." Id. at 11. In United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 n.4
(1962), the Court wrote that a "full-scale factual inquiry into the scope of the relevant
market" should "seldom be necessary" because Section 2-type market dominance is not
required, and "the requisite economic power may be found on the basis of either uniqueness
or consumer appeal." A different approach had been signalled by United States Steel Corp.
v. Fortner Enters., Inc. (Fortner 11), 429 U.S. 610, 618 n.10 (1977), which emphasized that
such a conclusion depends entirely on the absence of other explanations for the behavior.
See also Grappone Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 796 (1st Cir. 1988)
(Breyer, J.) ("the 'market power' hurdle is moderately high" and "cannot ordinarily be
surmounted simply by pointing to the fact of the tie itself or to a handful of objecting
customers").
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a [1] tying arrangement" 5 [2] "if the seller has 'appreciable economic
power' in the tying product market and [3] if the arrangement affects a
substantial volume of commerce in the tied market."' 5' In contrast, many
saw Jefferson Parish15' as supporting a test with so many factors and
defenses, some very broad, that tying had become per se in name only.' 58
Plaintiffs interested in a more streamlined per se rule can be expected
to cite Kodak even though the language is dictum.
Many had wondered whether the Court would use Kodak as an oppor-
tunity to revisit the debate betweenJefferson Parish's majority and concur-
rence over whether tying should be per se illegal at all. 5" The words "per
se" are conspicuously absent from Kodak's discussion of tying.'"" The
5 "A tying arrangement is 'an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that
he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.' " 112 S. Ct. at 2079 (quoting
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)). An identical sentence can be
found in the Ninth Circuit's opinion, see supra note 107.
156 112 S. Ct. at 2079 (quoting Fortner Enters., Inc., v. United States Steel Corp. (Fortier
1), 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)).
157Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
'5 The various elements of a tying claim are reviewed in ABA AN'TIRUST SECrION,
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 131-64 (3d ed. 1992).
"'E.g., Michael L. Weiner & James A. Keyte, Image Technical Services: More than
Meets the Eye, 6 ANTITRUST 18, 21 (Fall/Winter 1991). Justice O'Connor'sJefferson Parish
concurring opinion, which preferred a rule of reason, attracted three other votes. Only
four Justices joined Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court. Although the Court's and
Justice O'Connor's opinions have each lost two supporters (Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court; Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell
joined Justice O'Connor's concurrence), the conventional wisdom has been that the Court's
opinion is the more vulnerable. See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, The October 1989 Supreme Court
Term and Antitrust: Power, Access, and Legitimacy, 59 ANTITRUS'r L.J. 339, 376 (1990) (com-
menting on the consequence of Justice Brennan's retirement); cf, Jefferson Parish, 466
U.S. at 32 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., concurring) ("We have long held that tying
arrangements are subject to evaluation for per se illegality under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act" and the Court should "stand by" this "settled statutory interpretation and leave the
task of modifying the statute's reach to Congress").
Kodak, being more interested in winning than in changing antitrust law, had passed tip
the opportunity to tilt at the per se rule. It only hinted at the controversy and the possibility
for resolution:
The Court may ... wish to consider whether there is any continuing utility in
referring to tying arrangements as per se illegal given that courts must consider
tying market power, substantial adverse affects in the tied product market, and
business justifications before condemning a tie. Compare Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S.
at 11-18, with Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at5 (perseoffenses presumed unreasonable
"without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use").
Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 16 n.6.
'60 The words "per se" appear twice in the Court's opinion, each time as part of a rejection
of what the Court describes as an argument for per se legality. 112 S. Ct. at 2082 n. Ii, 2089
n.29.
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opinion included, moreover, what appears to be a nod toward the rule
of reason. As part of its discussion of the tying claim, the Court wrote
that it "need not decide" whether "any procompetitive effects ... out-
weigh the anticompetitive effects."' 6' At trial, the Court noted at the end
of its opinion, "Kodak's arguments may prove to be correct. It may be
that.., any anti-competitive effects of Kodak's behavior are outweighed
by its [pro]competitive effects."6 The Supreme Court would not "reach
these conclusions as a matter of law on a record this sparse."'6 3 The clear
implication is that Kodak will not be prevented from attempting to prove
that procompetitive effects predominate, and, were it to succeed in doing
so, it would prevail against the tying claim.
C. MARKET AND MONOPOLY POWER
It would be an exaggeration to say that a debate has raged over whether
"monopoly power" and "market power" are one and the same. More
accurately, a muddle has developed, with the words appearing inconsis-
tently and without precision. 4 The Court took a step toward clarifying
the situation: "Monopoly power under § 2 requires, of course, something
greater than market power under § 1.,, 165
"" 112 S. Ct. at 2088. "We note only that Kodak's service and parts policy is simply not
one that appears always or almost always to enhance competition, and therefore to warrant
a legal presumption without any evidence of its actual economic impact." Id. This phrasing
of an approach to summary judgment is eerily similar to the Court's famous standard for
identifying per se illegal practices: "Our inquiry must focus on ... whether the practice
facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition
and decrease output." Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
, 2 112 S. Ct. at 2092. This language is from a closing paragraph not specifically addressed
to the tying claim. The Court's specific rejection of Kodak's proffered justifications is in its
discussion of monopolization. Id. at 2091-92. Given the tying-specific discussion of balanc-
ing quoted in the text, however, the Court's closing language seems equally applicable to
both claims. Cf. inage Technical, 903 F.2d at 618-19 (court of appeals addressed Kodak's
justifications as part of deciding tying claim).
112 S. Ct. at 2092.
Stephen Calkins, Antitrust 1986-87: Power and Access (Part 1), 32 ANTITRUST BULL.
275, 294-98 (1987) (calling for clarity).
" " 112 S. Ct. at 2090 (citing Fortner 1, 394 U.S. at 502) (also noting Section 2's "more
stringent monopoly standard").
The parties did not really contest this issue. The Ninth Circuit had written that monopoly
power "is something more than the market power that is a prerequisite to liability under
Section 1." 903 F.2d at 621. Kodak agreed, arguing that this means that if Kodak lacks
market power for Section 1 it must lack monopoly power for Section 2. Petitioner's Brief
on the Merits at 17. Image Technical, too, seemed to agree. It argued, for instance, that
proof of actual forcing obviates the need to show market power, Brief of Respondent at
40 & n.27, which at least implies that it was thinking of market power as something short
of monopoly power.
The issue was, however, sharply contested by the amici. The Solicitor General minimized
the distinction between monopoly power and the market power required for a tying
violation:
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Kodak has created great uncertainty, however, about market definition
limited to a single brand of equipment, or parts for a single brand of
equipment. Justice Scalia, in dissent, said that the majority's willingness
to countenance such a market "threatens to release a torrent of litigation
and a flood of commercial intimidation that will do much more harm
than good."'6 6 The forecast of litigation is probably accurate but the
outcome of that litigation is uncertain. Although the opinion is unclear
on the point, the Court appears to have assumed, for purposes of the
litigation, that there is a separate market for parts for Kodak equip-
ment.'67 The Court merely refused (1) to eliminate all possibility of a
single-brand market, and (2) to find that competition in equipment made
power in parts so unlikely as tojustify summary judgment. The ultimate
impact of Kodak may turn on the frequency with which courts recognize
single-brand markets and especially markets for single-brand parts. Ko-
dak has made this more likely but it need not and should not become
commonplace.
D. MONOPOLIZATION
The Kodak Court boldly wrote that a monopolist may refuse to deal
with competitors "only if there are legitimate competitive reasons for the
refusal."'168 The Court had said this in Aspen Skiing but many doubted
whether the Court really meant it. Aspen Skiing was in many ways a unique
While the Court some years earlier said that per se unlawful tying does not depend
on "monopoly power," even then it. made clear that market power over price is
required. Per se unlawful tying, then, appears to require substantial market power,
power akin to monopoly power and quite close to monopoly power in degree.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22 n,21 (citations
omitted).
Twenty-nine states rushed to disagree, with a brief more than half of which was devoted
to this issue. Fortner I, they reminded the Court, declared that 't]he standard of'sufficient
economic power' does not ... require that the defendant have a monopoly or even a
dominant position throughout the market for the tying product'." Brief of Amicus Curiae
States Ohio et al. in Support of Respondents at 6-7 (quoting 394 U.S. at 502) We have seen
that the Kodak Court sided with the states, relying on Fortner 1. 112 S. Ct. at 2090. Another
amicus made the same point as the states, less strenuously but in words close to those
subsequently used by the Court, in Brief Amicus Curiae of National Electrical Manufactur-
ers Ass'n in Support of Petitioner at 5 ("Monopoly power, of course, is something greater
than market power.").
'66 112 S. Ct. at 2094. See also id. at 2101 ("the Court transforms § 2 from a specialized
mechanism for responding to extraordinary agglomerations (or threatened agglomera-
tions) of economic power to an all-purpose remedy against run-of-the-mill business torts").
161 See supra note 130. See also Official Transcript at 21 (Assistant Attorney General Rill
said it was conceded that parts could be a separate relevant market); id. at 26-27 (references
to this concession in questions apparently by ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustice Kennedy).
168 112 S. Ct. at 2091 n.32 (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
472 U.S. 585, 602-05 (1985)).
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case.'"I Now Aspen will be harder to limit; it (and Kodak) will continue to
be a challenge to interpret and apply. 7"
The Kodak Court wrote that there was evidence that "Kodak took
exclusionary action to maintain its parts monopoly and used its control
over parts to strengthen its monopoly share of the Kodak service market.
Liability turns, then, on whether 'valid business reasons' can explain
Kodak's actions."'
7
'
The consequences of such a test depend on the manner of its applica-
tion. The wording is indeterminate, much to the frustration of law-
abiding firms. The Court was maddeningly silent, moreover, on burdens
of proof.
7
1
Although Kodak provides only the beginning of an answer, it is signifi-
cant that the Court appraised Kodak's proffered justifications critically. 71
Anecdotes about customer preferences formed the basis of a rejection of
"" In Aspen, the Court emphasized that the defendant had not rejected a new offer, but
rather had "elected to make an important change in a pattern of distribution that had
originated in a competitive market and had persisted for several years." 472 U.S. at 603.
"Ski Co.'s decision to terminate the all-Aspen ticket was thus a decision by a monopolist to
make an important change in the character of the market." 472 U.S. at 604 (citing observa-
tion by Robert Bork that established patterns of distribution are likely to be efficient). For
criticism and attempted limitation of Aspen, see PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
1991 SUPPLEMENT TO ANTITRUST LAW 736.1f-.1g.
"' Merely one (albeit very serious) conundrum: declaring that one may not refuse to
deal says little about the terms and conditions under which one must agree to deal. At some
point terms and conditions become so onerous as to be tantamount to a refusal, yet it would
be unfortunate were many courts forced to become de facto economic regulators.
'7 The Court quoted Aspen Skiing, which in turn picked those words out of the jury
instruction given below. See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 597 (" '[A] company which possesses
monopoly power and which refuses to enter into a joint operating agreement with a
competitor or otherwise refuses to deal with a competitor in some manner does not violate
Section 2 if valid business reasons exists for that refusal.' ") (quoting jury instruction). The
Aspen Court reasoned that given this instruction and the jury's verdict for the plaintiff, the
Court "must assume that the jury concluded that there were no valid business reasons for
the refusal." 472 U.S. at 605. The Court then found that the record adequately supported
this conclusion.
Kodak also cited United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d. 416, 432 (2d Cir.
1945); see 112 S. Ct. at 2091. Alcoa said the "plaintiff was seeking to show that many
transactions, neutral on their face, were not in fact necessary to the development of'Alcoa's'
business, and had no motive except to exclude others and perpetuate its hold upon the
ingot market." Further down that page it abbreviated this to say the plaintiff "sought to
convict 'Alcoa' of practices in which it engaged, not because they were necessary to the
development of its business, but only in order to suppress competitors."
172 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit crisply declared that the "defendant bears the burden
of proving legitimate business reasons under Section 1" whereas the "plaintiff .., bears the
burden of proving lack of legitimate business justifications in a Section 2 claim." 903 F.2d
at 618 n.5, 620 n.9.
' The Court's discussion is reviewed above, text accompanying notes 134-37.
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a claimed concern about quality.'74 Kodak's claimed interest in concen-
trating responsibility for breakdowns fell before a non sequitur, when the
Court noted that Kodak said many customers are sophisticated enough to
engage in life cycle costing. (There is no reason to presume that the ability
to estimate costs is correlated with the ability to identify responsibility for
breakdowns.) The Court also criticized Kodak for inconsistently permit-
ting some firms to engage in self-service. Such behavior by Kodak could
say more about Kodak's bargaining power than about its genuine inter-
ests. The Court rejected Kodak's concerns about inventory control by
speculating that inventory should be unaffected by servicing arrange-
ments, a conclusion that is not obvious. (Lags and uncertainties are intro-
duced by anything that distances a firm from its market.) The point is
not that Kodak was necessarily right, but that the Court was strikingly
aggressive in its critique. Only time will tell how much this aggressiveness
was influenced by the case's posture.
Also striking was the Kodak Court's treatment of foreclosure and lever-
age. For instance, the Court wrote that "Kodak's alleged conduct-higher
service prices and market foreclosure-is facially anti-competitive and
exactly the harm that antitrust laws aim to prevent.' ' 75 Conspicuously
absent was any reference in Kodak to the generation of scholarship that
downplayed concern about foreclosure. 176 In response to the dissent's
observation "that all manufacturers possess some inherent market power
in the parts market,"' 77 the Court wrote that it had "held many times that
power gained through some natural and legal advantage ... can give rise
to liability if 'a seller exploits its dominant position in one market to
expand his empire into the next.' ,78
The Court thus appeared at least implicitly, if offhandedly, to condemn
leveraging as an antitrust violation. Whether leveraging by itself (i.e.,
using monopoly power in one market to gain an advantage in another
7, Proof that there are many fine amateur musicians who please many customers proves
little if anything about whether a couple is interested in quality when they hire a professional
to play at their wedding. Confidence and certainty are part of quality-based decision-
making.
'71 112 S. Ct. at 2088.
176 For more recent scholarly concerns about single-firm strategic behavior, see, e.g.,
Michael L. Katz, Vertical ContractualRelations, in I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
655 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989).
'7 112 S. Ct. at 2089 n.29.
171 Id. (quoting Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953),
and also citing Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)); United States v
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); and Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S.
458,463 (1938)). The dissent, too, quoted Times-Picayune's language with approval, adding
that "the antitrust laws do not permit even a natural monopolist to project its monopoly
power into another market." 112 S. Ct. at 2098-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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without threatening to gain a monopoly in that market) is illegal, has
long been controversial. 7 9 Only last year the Ninth Circuit squarely
rejected the theory, and the Supreme Court denied a petition for certio-
rari a month before deciding Kodak. "0 Although Kodak's language about
leveraging qualifies as dictum,' 8 ' it is sure to be used by plaintiffs and
perhaps by courts.
E. REBUFF OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL?
The Chicago School did not fare well in Kodak. What had been antici-
pated by many as a moment of triumph, the culmination of an appoint-
ments process that had lead to Republican domination of the Court,
turned into a bitter setback for friends of Chicago.' Some of the rejec-
tion can be seen in the Court's renewed interest in leverage and foreclo-
sure, which is discussed in the preceding subsection. Three other points
are worth noting."'8
" ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 250-52 (3d ed. 1992).
""0 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992). Justice White would have granted certiorari.
"' The Ninth Circuit, for instance, never discussed leveraging. The Supreme Court's
analysis is imprecise, but the facts of Kodak, as described by the Court, are quite unlike the
typical leveraging case. Image Technical's principal theory was that Kodak used its power
in parts to maintain and enhance its power in service. The Court appears to have regarded
Kodak as having monopoly power over both parts and service. See 112 S. Ct. at 2090. As
the language quoted in text above shows, moreover, the Court said that Kodak also "took
exclusionary action to maintain its parts monopoly." 112 S. Ct. at 2091. If these assertions
are taken at face value, the case involved wrongful behavior in each of two monopolized
markets, which would make leveraging unnecessary to the outcome.
512 See, e.g., Charles Rule, Back to the Dark Ages of Antitrust, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1992,
at A17. Of the current members of the Court, only Justice White was nominated by a
Democrat (President Kennedy). The other eight were nominated by Republicans: President
Nixon (Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens), Reagan (Justices Kennedy, O'Connor,
and Scalia), and Bush (Justices Souter and Thomas). President Reagan nominated Justice
Rehnquist for Chief Justice.
Anticipation of change was especially sharp because in 1985, when a more liberal Court
denied certiorari in Data General Corp. v. Digidyne Corp., 473 U.S. 908 (1985), Justice
Whitejoined by Justice Blackmun, dissented. Data General, which had lost a lock-in tying
case, persuaded these two Justices that the Court should address "what constitutes forcing
power in the absence of a large market share" and "whether market power over 'locked in'
customers must be analyzed at the outset of the original decision to purchase." 473 U.S. at
909. Since that denial of certiorari, Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas have
replaced Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Powell.
... Also interesting was Image Technical's effort to bolster the credibility of its economic
arguments by associating itself with an economist. A footnote informed the Court that
Image Technical's "analysis" of possible market or monopoly power had "been developed
with the assistance of Professor Steven C. Salop, Professor of Economics and Law at
Georgetown University Law School. Professor Salop is a recognized expert in the fields of
industrial organization, competition, and antitrust. He is cited with approval by Kodak."
Brief of Respondent at 20 n. 13 (citation omitted). Professor Salop is now working for Image
Technical in the case on remand.
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1. "Folksy Evidence"
During Kodak's rebuttal argument, Justice Stevens observed that Im-
age Technical "didn't offer theoretical evidence. But the Ninth Circuit
relied on a kind of folksy evidence, that, in fact, the service was less
expensive, provided by the competitors, and that sort of thing[].', 8 4 Ko-
dak's lawyer dismissed this as "a couple of anecdotes." When asked
whether there wouldn't be a "scintilla of evidence" of market power if
service competitors typically had prices "roughly half" of Kodak's, coun-
sel conceded there would be some evidence, just not enough.1'8 5
Justice Stevens's "folksy evidence" won the day. It would normally be
enough, Justice Blackmun began his analysis for the Court, that Image
Technical offered "evidence that consumers have switched to Kodak
service even though they preferred ISO service, that Kodak service was
of higher price and lower quality . . ., and that ISOs were driven out of
business by Kodak's policies..'' .. Kodak countered with economic theory.
"Folksy evidence," however, persuaded six Justices.'1 7
2. A Priori Reasoning
The Court was distinctly uncomfortable with the kind of a priori rea-
soning commonly used by the Chicago School. For instance, Justice
Scalia's dissent argued that a tie between parts and service could not
increase Kodak's ability to exploit "locked in consumers." Justice Scalia
argued that if Kodak wished to exploit these consumers, "it could plainly
do so without the inconvenience of a tie, through supracompetitive parts
pricing alone."' 8 In making this argument, Justice Scalia was on the
84 Official Transcript at 56 (an advocate identified the Justice); see 903 F.2d al 617:
For example, appellants have presented evidence that Kodak charges up to twice
as much as appellants for service that is of lower quality than appellants' service.
Appellants presented evidence that in some instances competition from ISOs
drove down the price that Kodak was willing to charge for service and that in
other instances some owners of large Kodak equipment packages will pay higher
prices for Kodak service rather than switch to competitors' systems.
'8 Official Transcript at 56-57.
8 112 S. Ct. at 2081.
... It should be noted that this evidence was appraised in the context of Image Technical's
claim that Kodak dominated a market for Kodak parts, and Kodak's rejoinder that it
nonetheless lacked market power. Although "folksy evidence" trumped economic theory
in Kodak, it is not clear whether such "folksy evidence" alone would have been sufficient.
Immediately after the language quoted in the text the Court wrote that "this evidence
would be sufficient to entitle respondents to a trial on their claim of market power."
Grammarians would say that "this evidence" refers to the evidence discussed in that para-
graph. It is at least conceivable that the Court meant to refer also to the evidence (about
control of parts) in the preceding paragraph. 112 S. Ct. at 2081.
"" 112 S. Ct. 2072-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In its brief, Kodak dismissed Image
Technical's "claim that market imperfections must exist"-despite their failure to show
any-because "the actual 'aftermarkets' in which Kodak competes [have] not behaved as
1993]
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
firmest of Chicago School grounds.'" The Court, however, turned this
reasoning on its head, by wondering "why Kodak would adopt this expen-
sive tying policy if it could achieve the same profits more conveniently
through some other means. ' ' 9"
This is a very different approach than was used in the more Chicago
School Court opinions."m Although the Court claimed it was continuing
Kodak's economic theory would suggest" (quoting from page 9 of Image Technical's brief
opposing certiorari).
But this misses the point. The question is not how the aftermarkets perform
standing alone, but whether super-competitive pricing in the aftermarkets could
enhance Kodak's overall position-and, conversely, harm consumers-given the
inevitable effects of aftermarket pricing on Kodak's future equipment and service
sales. The answer is no. Kodak's conceded lack of market power in the equipment
market dooms any attempt to extract monopoly profits, even in allegedly "imper-
fect" aftermarkets.
Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 22.
Justice Scalia further ruminated that, although price discrimination would gain nothing
because sophisticated consumers who are locked in are as helpless as unsophisticated ones,
the Robinson-Patman Act would not prevent discrimination in favor of sophisticated
consumers. Justice Scalia reasoned that the Robinson-Patman Act would not be violated
because the requisite competitive effect is difficult to show in markets in which businesses
purchase for their own consumption. 112 S. Ct. at 2099-2100 n.3.
'" Kodak quoted Professor Ward Bowman, who wrote that "[a] competitive supplier,
selling at the prevailing price and attempting to impose a tie-in upon a buyer, would merely
be displaced by a seller who did not," Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE
L.J. 19, 20 (1957) (footnote omitted), see Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 19; Professor,
now judge, Frank Easterbrook, who wrote that a seller without market power "cannot
sustain deleterious practices," Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUSTr
L.J. 135, 159 (1984), see Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 19; andjudge Easterbrook again,
who wrote:
Given that a practice indulged without market power is either beneficial to consum-
ers or self-defeating to its practitioners, why use the courts to condemn the
conduct? ... [C]ondemning questionable practices pursued by firms without [mar-
ket] power will spin the wheels of the courts-at great expense-for no substantial
result. Markets have a comparative advantage over courts in dealing with the
conduct of firms that lack market power.
Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 983, 989 (1987), see Petitioner's
Brief on the Merits at 19. Kodak also quoted Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Jefferson
Parish: "If the seller of flour has no market power over flour, it will gain none by insisting
that its buyers take some sttgar as well." 466 U.S. at 37-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring), see
Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 19-20.
112 S. Ct. at 2089 n.29. The Court noted that Image Technical offered "an alternative
theory, supported by the record, that suggests Kodak is able to exploit some customers who
in the absence of a tie would be protected from increases in parts prices by knowledgeable
consumers." Id. at 2089 n.29. The Court also pointed to the plaintiffs' claim of "forced
unwanted purchases at higher prices and price discrimination." Id. at 2089 n.29. "While it
may be, as the dissent predicts, that the equipment market will prevent any harms to
consumers in the after markets, the dissent never makes plain why the Court should accept
that theory on faith rather than requiring the usual evidence needed to win a summary
judgment motion." 112 S. Ct. at 2089 n.29.
,' The most notable such opinions are Business Electronics and Justice O'Connor's four-
Justice concurrence in Jefferson Parish. Kodak dashed Chicagoan dreams that these would
be joined by many more.
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settled practice (as courts so often do), it seemed deliberately to highlight
the change: "Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions
rather than actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust
law."' 92 Kodak's procedural posture exacerbated this concern, ' " but the
concern has wide potential application.
3. Trust in the Market
More generally, the Court showed less faith in the robustness of the
market than is associated with Chicago School thinkers. Even sophisti-
cated buyers may lack information, the Court observed, because informa-
tion is expensive to acquire and participants in the market may have
untoward incentives." 4 Competitors may remain reticent if the market is
an oligopoly and they hope to profit from buyer ignorance. Sophisticated
buyers may not solve the problem, because price discrimination may
prevent their participation from improving the lot of the unsophisti-
cated. '95
The potential importance of this new hesitancy cannot be overstated.
Most notably, it has possible ramifications for the "sophisticated buyer"
defense in merger law, 9 6 but it goes well beyond that. Perhaps the essen-
tial difference between activists and more permissive antitrust thinkers
is the degree of confidence in the market's ability to remedy problems."'
9'2 112 S. Ct, at 2082. "This Court has preferred to resolve antitrust claims on a case-by-
case basis, focusing on the 'particular facts disclosed by the record.' In determining the
existence of market power ... this Court has examined the economic reality of the market
at issue." 112 S. Ct. at 2082 (citations and footnotes omitted). Among the authorities on
which the Court relied was Justice White's concurring opinion in Continental TV., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977), where lie argued for preserving the per se
rule against certain nonprice vertical restraints.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 139-40.
'"" One can almost imagine plaintiffs' lawyers assembling parades of plaintiffs prepared
to declare that they are less sophisticated than the plaintiffs in Kodak. Kodak made a
point of reminding the Court that " 'sophisticated business purchasers of technologically
advanced and complex equipment' " such as were involved in these markets were among
the customers most capable of effectively estimating costs. Petitioner's Reply Brief on the
Merits at 12 n. 12 (quoting 9 PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRusT LAW 1712, at 145 (1991)). This
may have overstated the consistency of the buyer expertise, but surely there are many
markets in which buyers are less capable than in Kodak.
'95 112 S. Ct. at 2086-87. The 1992Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104, §§ 1.12,
1.22, 1.42, also highlighted the importance of price discrimination in any evaluation of
markets and market power.
116 Herbert Hovenkamp, Mergers and Buyers, 77 VA. L, REV. 1369 (1991). The 1992
Merger Guidelines analyze how buyer characteristics can in some circumstances reduce the
risk of anticompetitive results. 1992 Merger Guidelines § 2.12. Kodak is unlikely to affect
significantly this kind of very specific consideration of buyers; instead, it cautions against
more blunderbuss assertions that large customers eliminate antitrust concern.
")7 Also important is the converse of this, namely, the comparative confidence in the
ability of government intervention to improve matters. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook,
Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law, 75 CAL. L. REv. 983 (1987).
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At the extreme, true believers in the power of markets would reject all
or virtually all antitrust enforcement. '9 Yet this choice is not binary; it is
a continuum, and one's place on the continuum says much about one's
view of antitrust. In Kodak, the Court staked out a position surprisingly
far to the interventionist side.
Blame or credit for this positioning must go significantly to the amici
who participated in the case. Amici protested that the world did not work
the way Kodak suggested. Amici highlighted the distinction between
monopoly and market power. Amici developed and provided many of
the arguments and authorities the Court found persuasive. Kodak found
itself fighting a rear-guard action against changing factual, economic,
and legal assertions. The evolving nature of the argument handicapped
not only Kodak but also the Court, which had to consider issues that
continued to develop even during oral argument.'
D. CONCLUSION
Kodak has sweeping declarations but confining facts. Everything about
the case was premature: the summary judgment motion, Judge
Schwarzer's decision, the grant of certiorari, the Court's addressing of
critical economic and legal issues even while the arguments were chang-
ing. For better or worse, however, the case offers important teaching
about summary judgment, tying, market and monopoly power, monopo-
lization, and antitrust economics. How these lessons will be applied in
particular cases will make all the difference. Kodak's progeny, if any, will
determine whether the case is sui generis, an antitrust fountainhead, or
a Pandora's Box.
IV. SUMMARY
In this significant Supreme Court antitrust year amici played leading
and in part beneficial roles. They highlighted tension between theories
set forth by parties and alternative views of actual practices. In Morales
the amicus federal government prevented the states from arguing suc-
cessfully that they were acting consistently with federal interests. Ticor
became a different case when the states explained the very limited extent
of actual regulation. The Kodak litigation changed dramatically when
1'" E.g., DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A POLICY
FAILURE (1982).
" At the very end of his oral argument, for instance, Kodak's lawyer was asked about
Kodak's alleged favoring of its more sophisticated customers. He responded only very
briefly, with time running out, that the sell-servicing customers are merely the largest, not
the most sophisticated; he thus did not address the argument that later appealed to the
Court. Official Transcript at 18.
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customers and insurance companies came forward to dispute Kodak's
depiction of the competitive process.
Participation by amici also imposed costs, however. The Ticor amici
camouflaged the case's difficulty, since the regulators (or their lawyers)
said there was no regulation. In Morales, the United States's highlighting
of inconsistencies between state and federal approaches made the out-
come seem pre-ordained, but left difficult line-drawing for later. In
Kodak the Court was obliged to address important issues, arguments, and
authorities raised by amici very late in the proceedings. The timing made
adequate briefing and debate impossible; the result was an opinion with
a mother lode of analysis and discussion the import of which cannot now
be known.

